The GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture, 2009

CONTROLLING VIOLENT CRIME: MODELS AND POLICY OPTIONS
Anthony Harriott

The GraceKennedy Foundation

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The Lecture

The GraceKennedy Foundation

The GraceKennedy Foundation was established in 1982 on the 60th anniversary of GraceKennedy and Company Limited.

The Foundation expresses, in a tangible way, GraceKennedy's commitment to Jamaica's development by making grants to deserving community groups, in support of its stated objectives, which are as follows:

- To develop and promote the arts, health, culture, and sports;
- To establish and carry on programmes for the development of education and skills of people in Jamaica;
- To develop programmes aimed at the upliftment of the spiritual well-being of individuals.

Guided by clearly formulated policies, the Directors have focused on assistance in three areas: community services; our heritage; and education; the last receiving the greatest emphasis. The Foundation's scholarship and bursary programme is, therefore, an important component of its activity.

By supporting capable and talented people and those who contribute to the development of their communities, the Foundation works towards achieving its main purpose, the development of Jamaica's human resources, on which our future as a nation depends.

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The GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture Series

Copies of Lectures are available from the GraceKennedy Foundation, 73 Harbour Street, Kingston.

The GraceKennedy Foundation Lectures

Since 1989, the annual GraceKennedy Lecture has highlighted subjects of social and economic concern. This year's Lecture continues that tradition as it spotlights the issues associated with the control of violent crime.

The increase in the levels of crime and violence in Jamaica has been traumatic for the nation's citizens. The scourge of crime has penetrated even our schools as the youth solve their problems in an aggressively confrontational manner which too often has ended in the death of one of the contenders. The problem of crime is not confined to Jamaica but is one that the entire region has had to confront.

The Lecture, which will focus on models and policy options for the control of crime, is timely and should provide practical recommendations to contribute to the lessening of crime in Jamaica and the Caribbean

The Foundation hopes that by providing copies to schools and public libraries, the Lecture's reach will extend beyond those present at its delivery. We welcome and look forward to your comments.

Caroline Mahfood
Executive Director/Secretary
GraceKennedy Foundation

GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture, 2009

The annual GraceKennedy lectures engage the Jamaican public in hearing, reading, discussing, analyzing and assessing various issues of national importance. This year the lecture presentation and discussion is one which resonates with the majority of the population as an urgent and crucial national concern – crime and security.

The GraceKennedy Foundation is honoured to have Professor Anthony Harriott as its 2009 lecturer. Professor Harriott will be discussing with us the very complex and problematic issues associated with the control of violent crime – highlighting, no doubt, urban and gang-related violence, the increase in organized crime, and the challenges and threats posed to national security by global crime networks which deal in drugs and gun trafficking. It is crucial that we understand the multi-faceted nature of the problem and its challenges. Over many years, Jamaicans have been inundated with theories as to the causes of crime but effective solutions have so far eluded us. The Foundation is pleased, therefore, that Professor Harriott is leading us, in this lecture, beyond discussion and analysis of the problem of violent crime and focussing on models and policy options which could provide solutions for its control.

Professor Harriott is ideally suited to undertake this task. He is Professor of Political Sociology in the Department of Government at the Mona Campus of The University of the West Indies (UWI), a department he currently heads, and has also served as a Visiting Professor at the Department of Sociology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York (CUNY) and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington. He is also Director of the Institute for Public Safety and Justice at the UWI.

A UWI graduate, he has demonstrated excellence at every stage of his academic career. He not only received first class

honours in his undergraduate degree but was also first in his class, receiving the Dean's Award for Excellence. He was awarded the Alcan Junior Research Fellowship for outstanding work in the M.Phil programme, and then the Adlith Brown Memorial Prize for outstanding scholarship and the best doctoral dissertation in the Social Sciences across the three UWI campuses. This dissertation, entitled "Race, Class and the Political Behaviour of the Jamaican Security Forces", identified early his interest in the issues associated with crime and its control. The excellence of his scholarship has resulted in the conferral of awards in his work life as well, and he received the Principal's Award at the UWI, Mona Campus, for "Best Publication in the Social Sciences" in 2001 and 2007 and was recognized as "The Most Outstanding Researcher in the Faculty of Social Sciences" in 2004 and 2007. He is also the recipient of a Ford Foundation Fellowship to complete the book *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies*. This will be the fifth book that he has either authored or edited and all address primarily issues of violence, drugs and policing in Caribbean societies. The most recent, published by the UWI Press in 2008 and entitled *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus*, explores the relationship between crime and politics which has been a matter of serious concern for many persons over many years. In addition to the books he has authored or edited, Professor Harriott has contributed book chapters to a number of publications, has authored over thirty scholarly articles, and has made numerous presentations at conferences and in other public fora. Some of these articles and presentations have fascinating titles such as:

- "Captured Shadows, Tongue-Tied Witnesses, Complainants and the Courts: Obeah and Social Control"
- "Guns, Gangs, and Governance in Jamaica"
- "Yardies and Dons: Globalization and the Rise of Caribbean Transnational Organized Crime", and

- "The Policeman's Gun is Licensed to Kill: Policing, Politics and Human Rights in Jamaica"

In January of 2009 a presentation at the Jamaica Conference Centre warned, through its title, that: " '… the storm clouds that were on the horizon are getting nearly directly overhead': Violent Crime in the Caribbean – Causes and Challenges".

Professor Harriott currently teaches courses in criminal justice and has designed and introduced three undergraduate courses which have now made it possible for students to pursue a criminology and criminal justice minor. He is also serving as academic supervisor for six M.Phil/Ph.D candidates and a number of M.Sc students; this is being used strategically to develop a network of scholars who are actively engaged in research on crime and criminal justice issues in the Caribbean. Realizing this objective is also facilitated through the staging, every three years, of the Caribbean Conferences on Crime and Criminal Justice. The Caribbean network, through association with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Prevention, is now being linked with a wider network of scholars and practitioners in Southern Africa.

Given his significant work and experience it is not surprising that Professor Harriott is in great demand to provide consultancy services in Jamaica and other Caribbean countries, and he has successfully completed various projects for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the British government, USAID, UNICEF, the UN Commission on Crime and Criminal Justice, the World Bank, IDB, PAHO, and various arms of the Government of Jamaica – The Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of National Security and Justice, and the Ministry of Health – as well as the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Professor Harriott has also served as an advisor to the Minister of National Security and Justice (Government of Jamaica), as a member of the CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime which was constituted by the CARICOM Heads of Government, as well as

the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime and Criminal Justice Programme. He is a member of a number of professional organizations including the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American Society of Criminology, and has presented a number of scholarly papers at the meetings of these organizations.

The GraceKennedy Foundation is very honoured to have Professor Harriott deliver the 2009 Lecture on a very topical and highly relevant subject. We anticipate and hope that this presentation will generate significant debate nationally, regionally and internationally and that from this debate, we can all identify how we can be part of the solutions required to confront this very serious issue in our society.

Elsa Leo-Rhynie, C.D.
Chair
GraceKennedy Foundation

Anthony Harriott

The Lecture

I
INTRODUCTION

For some time now I have been a student of the problems of insecurity and related phenomena – their manifestations, how they are constructed, their sources, and the reactions and responses of the responsible institutions of the state and the society to these problems. I started off with a concern that public policy and the behaviour of some of the state institutions were complicating the problems.

Bad crime control policy is but one of the ways that public policy is implicated in the crime problem. For example, a liberal use of incarceration as simply the separation of convicts from the society without much thought to the conditions of the incarceration may reinforce criminality by facilitating the transmission of the patterns of moral thinking that neutralize any societal disapprobation of their criminal careers. It may also facilitate the transfer of technical know-how and expertise in crime. Excessive punishment and illegal crime control methods may affirm already existing views of the unjust nature of the criminal justice system and justify non-cooperation with it as well as self-help alternatives to it.

Another more indirect way in which policy may have a negative impact is by deepening the "root" and proximate causes of crime. For example, policies that result in increased youth unemployment and inequality may make worse the structural conditions that are associated with some categories of crime. High inflation rates tend to increase inequality and a protracted period of high inflation rates and economic instability may alter people's time horizons for achieving key life goals. People lose confidence in the economic future. They believe that tomorrow will be worse. Material acquisitions thus become "now or never" predicaments. Shorter time horizons for achieving major life goals may give an impulse to criminality and the use of corrupt

methods. High customs duties on selected commodities may encourage the smuggling of these commodities (for example, rum and cigarettes) and the formation of corrupt networks that include customs officials. These networks may later be used to traffic drugs and illegal firearms. Policy becomes a proximate cause of high-end and violent crimes. There are no necessary associations and inevitabilities here. Much more work is needed if we are to better understand these processes. My purpose is simply to alert you to the possibilities. The second type, those that reinforce the primary causes of crime, are the unintended and perhaps difficult to foresee consequences of public policy. The first category, that is, bad crime control policies, may, however, be anticipated and more easily avoided.

Twenty years later, despite the improvements in policy documentation (the *National Security Policy* (2007), the *Jamaica Constabulary Force Corporate Strategy 2005–2008* (2005), and the *Jamaican Justice System Reform Task Force – Final Report* (2007)[1] and recent advances in the policy-making capabilities of the Ministry of National Security, I remain even more concerned and convinced that public policy is implicated in our crime problem.[2] The point that I wish to make is that we should be more conscious about the possible consequences of public policy and the trade-offs that are made. The more important issue that arises from this is, however, that of responsibility. Governments tend to blame the previous administration for creating the difficulties. Parties just out of government may even blame new governments. The police blame the citizens for non-cooperation with them and for giving support to criminals and the citizens blame the police for their heavy-handed tactics and corrupt practices. There is some truth in all of these claims but these truths should not be used to deflect responsibility. Ownership of the crime problem is the first step that any political administration, state institution and citizen must take toward finding solutions to the problem.

My concern with the crime problem is not simply an "academic" one. While I am deeply interested in knowing, my primary motivation is to contribute to making the society better by making it safer and more just. Doing should be informed by knowing and by values. I believe that public policy is best when it is informed by systematically acquired and valid evidence, distilled experience and morally acceptable, explicitly stated political values. When evidence is adduced it may be critically evaluated. When experience is distilled in the form of lessons, the validity and applicability of these lessons may be judged by others who have also shared in these experiences. When values are explicitly acknowledged, they may be scrutinized by all. These things foster public education, rational, deliberative policy-making and consensus-building. This is an ideal. I am not suggesting that commentary on the subject that is not based on systematic research should be disregarded; I simply wish that we were closer to the ideal. Policy is, however, not always based on rationality. It tends to be informed by ideology and driven by interests. This is understandable. Moreover, in a democracy, experts of all types (consultants, law enforcement officials and academic researchers) should not have a monopoly on policy-making. Disinterested research should, however, have a place in policy-making.

In our conditions, public safety and social justice are twinned. When there is equality of opportunity and people are treated fairly and believe that they are treated fairly, they tend to comply with the rules that guarantee them fair treatment, and support the institutions that enforce these rules. When they are treated unfairly there is alienation from rules, law and institutions. Law and law enforcement become and are seen as oppressive tools. In most societies, the law and law enforcement tend to be downward directed. This was certainly true of Jamaica. The vagrancy laws were seen as such. And I believe that the ganja laws and laws regulating vending are also regarded by many as

anti-poor and oppressive. These, we suspect, are not consensus laws. Their enforcement therefore cannot be based on consensus and is thus likely to be ineffective. In the colonial period, law was viewed as a tool for controlling the "dangerous classes". Despite the changes since Independence, these are the lens through which the present laws and law enforcement are still viewed by many. History generates considerable inertia and, in addition, the current practices of the system provide experiential reinforcement of these views. This generates conflict within the society that at times takes the form of demands for justice in response to injustices meted out by the criminal justice system. This is likely to continue until law enforcement becomes more universally applied and consensus based on common values develops. Bias may be an excuse for poor law abidance in general or it may be an impulse to remove bias and have the laws applied without exception to both the poor and the powerful. We may all seek individual and group exemptions or call for universal application. Jamaicans are yet to make up their minds about this.

Jamaica has a full-spectrum crime problem with American-type Ponzi schemes, Nigerian-like 419 confidence rackets, Italian Mafia style entrepreneurship and the full range of street crimes, but most of all we have a problem of violence. We have a problem of violence on steroids. Elsewhere I have described this condition as a subculture of violence.[3] This is a way of saying that the use of violence, especially to settle conflicts, is becoming institutionalized. Associated with this but distinct from it, I would argue that we have a system of violence. By a system of violence I mean that there are many interconnected, vested interests in the various forms of violence. Violence makes money. It may make money as simple, predatory activity such as robbery and it may make money in more systematic and complex predatory ways such as protection rackets, the corrupt acquisition of state contracts and their execution without the hindrances of labour problems and the inspection of work done. It may also make

money for different individuals who are variously located in criminal groups, the state bureaucracy, the political parties and law enforcement, acting together or supporting each other in various ways.

> *Violence is a business. It is organized and marketed to yield a regular return as in the case of extortion and protection rackets. Violence brings social success. Violence validates and elevates status. Violence brings political success. It may be used to acquire and consolidate political power as "safe seats" in the parliament. It has therefore become self-perpetuating.*

At the heart of this self-perpetuating system is organized crime. These are the main problems, the main challenges that any crime prevention and control policy and strategy must confront and integrated with them is the third problem of the tolerance of some forms of violent crime within the society.

The realities of a subculture of violence and a system of violence mean that violence control is a difficult project that requires a sustained effort. I have argued that if we begin to work systematically at it, it is possible that in 20–30 years we should be able to bring these problems under control and to return Jamaica to what we may call a normal crime problem. As Francis Bacon noted centuries ago:

> In all things and especially in the most difficult ones, we cannot expect one to concomitantly sow and reap the harvest…[4]

It is difficult to ask the citizens of Jamaica not to expect and demand instant results. Some 1,500 lives are being lost every year. Twenty to thirty years is therefore a long wait for the harvest. I do not make the point that control is a long-term project as a means of deflecting attention from the immediacy of the situation. On the contrary, I think that this point emphasizes the extraordinary character of the present situation. Urgent,

carefully thought through consensus measures to achieve short-term control goals is necessary.

The medium- to long-term goal of policy should be to have a normal crime problem, that is, one that is normal in statistical terms. In most countries of the world the incidence of violent crime is much lower than that of property crime. Jamaica's pattern is abnormal because of the disproportionately high incidence of violence. A *normal pattern* of crime is one where the structure of criminal offending becomes similar to that of most countries in the world; that is, the number of incidents of violent crime does not exceed the number of property crimes. A normal pattern should be achieved by reducing the level of violence to a normal rate. A *normal rate* of violent crime and of homicide would be no more than 25 per cent above the global mean. In my judgment, this latter objective is what may be achievable in 20 to 30 years.

We must, however, have more immediate and intermediate goals that are strategy defining. We may consider three markers or stages in the process of turning around the crime problem.

- The first goal should be to get violent crime under control. This means preventing any further increase in the rate of violent crime and any further empowerment of criminal groups. Violence reduction should not be determined by criminal groups and should not involve paying them to suspend the violence. To the extent that this is done its outcome is a false security. Violence control and prevention is achievable by making the existing response mechanisms more efficient and effective.

- The second goal should be to reduce the levels of violence so that the structure of criminal offending approximates the Caribbean norm; that is, a ratio of no more than one incident of violent crime to two incidents of property crime. At this point, Jamaica's homicide rate and its rate of violent crime should also approximate the Caribbean mean. This requires

significant changes in policing, reform of the larger criminal justice system and crime prevention programmes that are focussed on high-violence communities.

- At the third stage, the objective should be to reduce the level of violent crime to within 25 per cent of the global mean. This would mean reducing the homicide rate to five times less than what it now is. In my judgment, fairly fundamental changes in how the institutions of the criminal justice system operate, in the relationship between criminal networks and the political organizations, and improvements in the economy and better integration of the communities of the urban poor, are required in order to achieve this outcome.

Setting goals in this way is useful as achievable markers but, more important, they should also serve to inform strategy. For example, achieving stage one may require a somewhat different approach or emphasis than that which is appropriate for stage two. If we take the debate about the relative importance of law enforcement and social interventions and view it in terms of the above goals, we may ask which is more important at each stage. The answer may be that law enforcement is more important at stage one and that the need for social crime prevention increases in importance and is likely to be more effective once we enter stage two. The debate thus becomes less general and forces a more detailed understanding of the problem. I will return to this issue.

If having an extraordinary crime problem is difficult, an even greater problem is when a country does not have the institutional capacity to respond to it effectively. Even more difficult is when the country has neither the capacity nor the collective will to make the changes that are necessary in order to effectively respond.

I believe that Jamaica is in this latter situation and has been for some time. Elsewhere, I have tried to explain the first problem, that is, the character of the crime problem.[5] The focus of this lecture is to try to better estimate and explain the response problems. Weak civic and political will is underpinned by problems of the social structure, crime dependency and a destructively competitive politics that puts party interests above national interests. The deep social divisions and distrust make social consensus difficult. Political competitiveness between self-interested parties and distrust of state institutions make political consensus difficult. Moreover, the emergence of illegal opportunity structures that provide economic and other material benefits to communities and society has resulted in greater ambivalence towards some categories of crime. In this lecture we explore some of these issues. However, the main thrust is simply to critically evaluate the perspective on how best to respond to the crime problem. Against this backcloth, I discuss the options for responding to the problem. I therefore try to do a bit more than put forward my perspective on what I think should be done. This may be a more guarded approach that accepts the limits of my work but, I hope, it is also more useful.

I will not attempt to provide a list of recommendations that consists of 101 concrete short-term measures that the government should pursue. They already have a list of 1001 such measures and we have demanded implementation without a critical examination of many of these proposals from the various reports that have been done. To the extent that I make any concrete suggestions, these should be taken as being simply illustrative of the larger policy approaches that have been taken and/or as examples that are intended to provoke new thinking and to show other possibilities. These are not demands on anyone. I will also exclude the issue of implementation and its politics. This is a vital issue but I could not do it justice here.

Existing policies and institutions are failing to adequately respond to the twin challenges of organized crime and the emergence of a subculture of violence. Here it is argued that policy is not sufficiently aligned with the character and sources of the problems and the response capabilities of the state institutions.

An examination of the spatial distribution of violent crime in Jamaica will reveal a pattern of concentration in the communities of the urban poor. It will almost perfectly overlay the patterns of urban social exclusion. Some categories of crime are conditioned, however, not just by a deficit of legitimate opportunities but also by access to illegitimate opportunities and a supporting environment. The response of the state has been largely a state disciplinary one. This is an important aspect of any response. The state, however, does not have the disciplinary power, the capacity or the moral authority (categories that link state to society) to independently control the problem. Improved disciplinary power and authority may be more effective if it is based on a coupling of legal or formal state control with informal social control or the power of the citizen – so that both are mutually reinforcing. A socially constructive linking of both may require the transformation of elements of the criminal justice system including new styles of law enforcement, changes in the architecture of the system and power relationships with the public, and better integrating the communities of the urban poor. These are the twin transformational challenges.

This is an ambitious project and simply sketching it is itself ambitious, given my own limitations and the state of knowledge in the field. As a social focus, criminology is over 200 years old. Following the historians of the discipline, we may mark its beginning with the publication, in 1794, of *An Essay on Crimes and Punishment* by Cesare Beccaria. However, as an academic discipline grounded in the social sciences, it is a twentieth century creation. In the Caribbean it is even younger but the

institutionalization of the social sciences and their application to the problems of the Caribbean is now over 50 years old. The West Indies Collection at the Main Library of the Mona campus of The University of the West Indies houses some 50,164 books and several periodicals on different aspects of society, economy and polity of the region.[6] Much basic knowledge has been accumulated but many problems and issues have not been adequately studied. For example, very little evaluation research has been done on the many crime prevention and control projects and programmes that have been introduced in recent times.

Not to be aware of the advances in knowledge is to act in ignorance. Not to be aware of our limitations is to risk becoming arrogant and/or frustrated with governments for not implementing our excellent proposals. I am not qualified to speak on the extent to which I suffer the former affliction but, regarding the latter, this has been softened somewhat by age and having had the benefit of serving on the Caribbean Task Force on Crime (2001–2002), the National Task Force on National Security, Government of Jamaica (2007–)[7], the Special Task Force on Crime that advised the Leader of the Opposition (2006), a number of boards that were established to assist with the reform of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in the 1990s, and other committees. Through these experiences I have come to better understand the limitations of our governments and the NGOs. I am very grateful for these opportunities which have pushed me to clarify my thinking on these matters. Given the limits described and my own limitations, this is not likely to be my last word on the subject. Moreover, we are faced with a changing social environment and a very dynamic crime situation. One must be open-minded and willing to adjust to the changing realities. To do this requires attention to the facts and a willingness to learn from our experiences. Let us return to the idea that greater emphasis should be placed on

"social interventions"; that is, social crime prevention relative to policing. One may approach this as an ideological issue, or a notion that it is always better to do prevention. Experience may lead one to a similar conclusion based on distrust of the police. Alternatively, one may approach the issue with an open (but not values-indifferent) mind that is constantly examining the evidence and the changes in the environment. I have adjusted my view on this issue by constantly revisiting the data. I will return to this issue later. For now, I mention it as an example of the need for openness to evidence.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Elsa Leo-Rhynie and the GraceKennedy Foundation for the opportunity to further develop my ideas on this subject and to be able to present and discuss them with you. First, a brief description of the problem will be given. Second, the crime prevention and control options are described in terms of models and the experiences with them discussed with a focus on the present policies and why they have had such a limited impact. Finally, an alternate approach is sketched.

II
THE CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM

Noel Silvera, a former Minister of Home Affairs, argued that:

> The nature of crime is such that it tells us something about Jamaicans and the Jamaican society. That is, the violence is symptomatic; it gives off something going wrong deep down in the social structure. The solution thus must come to grips with the social issues that give rise to violence in Jamaica.[8]

Silvera suggested that illiteracy, unemployment, poor housing and poor parenting were "the social issues that give rise to violence in Jamaica". This was speculative as the necessary empirical work had not yet been done. Silvera may not have been right on the specifics of what the violence told us about Jamaicans and Jamaica but he sensed that existing crime control policy would be somewhat limited in its impact if the social roots of the problem were not better understood. And he said it in 1972.

In his book *Thinking about Crime*, which was first published in 1975, James Q. Wilson (1985) argued that an analysis of the root causes of crime is quite unnecessary for policy development as some root or primary causes are unchangeable. Given that masculinity is a "cause" of violence, to illustrate his point, he cited what he then regarded as the impossibility of changing men into women as a way of reducing violence. Causal analysis, he suggested, may misdirect policy towards unachievable goals. We now know that it is possible to change men into women, but I rather doubt that most men would agree to this solution. Wilson regarded the view that "no problem is adequately addressed unless its causes are eliminated" as a "causal fallacy".[9]

An understanding of "root causes" may indeed be unnecessary. One may muddle through on an understanding

of the proximate causes. However, unlike Wilson, I believe this type of analysis is useful. Causes may be manipulated without necessarily "eliminating" them. A society may, for example, reduce income inequality and promote equality of opportunity in a trade-off with the rates of some categories of violent crime – without seeking to eliminate inequality. It may control its birth rate and consequently reduce the number and proportion of young males in its population without seeking to eliminate males. It may reduce its rate of youth unemployment without eliminating youth and unemployment. Social engineering has been a long-standing feature of societies. A basic understanding of the crime phenomenon is logically prior to policy development.

This is not just a matter of empirically identifying causes. People make up their own explanations and define the problem in different ways. How the problem is defined influences the policy responses. If the crime problem is defined as primarily a moral problem, then a "values and attitudes" campaign may be an appropriate response to it. The appropriate site of such interventions may be the community and family, and the types of intervention may involve the moral and civic education of adults and training in parenting skills. The intervening agents and sources of knowledge and authority may be the church (as morality is, in the minds of many, exclusively associated with religion) and various state social welfare agencies. If the crime problem is defined as an individual developmental problem, then the focus may be on early childhood nutrition and the development of cognitive skills with the school as the site of intervention and the medical profession as the appropriate source of knowledge. The problem of criminality may also be constructed politically, in various ways. One such way is expressed in the narrative of the politician as manipulator of innocent inner-city youth who are too poor to buy guns and too innocent to have a design to use them and therefore must be

armed by the politicians and given a mission by them. In this narrative the young men are helpless pawns, deprived of agency. The solution then is to sanitize the political system and to liberate young males from its spell. Another political construction is the idea of the inner-city people as a dangerous class and those among them who are given to criminality as irredeemable. This feeds into the advocacy of politically repressive policies directed at the group. Action leads to reaction. Thus, in response, a counter-narrative has developed that the criminal masterminds are mainly wealthy business persons and middle-class politicians and that there is "a lot of blood flowing from the hills" of St. Andrew where much of the Kingston middle strata and the wealthy leaders of organized crime networks reside.

Some of these narratives read like class battles that throw up clouds of dust but there may nevertheless be a bit of truth in each of the above. The difficulty with them is that the crime problem is either seen in very general terms, or one aspect of it is overemphasized and a partiality or bias is introduced. It is no longer useful for policy purposes to present the Jamaican crime problem in general terms. To the fisherman, it is not very helpful to describe the sea as blue. Being able to distinguish between the different shades of blue is vital to him. These distinctions inform the types of action that he must take, for example, where to set his fishing pots.

For us, I think that a critical question that should be asked in order to elaborate an appropriate strategy and policy is, what is the centre of gravity of the crime problem? Identification of the centre of gravity or heart of the matter gives policy a thrust and a chance of efficiency and effectiveness rather than dissipation of effort and limited resources.

There have been three major developments that have shaped the character of the crime problem in Jamaica during the last three decades. These are the rise of organized crime, the emergence of a subculture of violence and, related to this, an increased tolerance of some categories of violent crime. A test of crime prevention and control policy is the extent to which it is consistent with the character of the problem that it is supposed to target. If they are to be effective, policy and strategy must target these three aspects and constantly improve the institutional capacity to do so.

Organized Crime

The first in the triad is organized crime. It is associated with the commercialization of crime. It involves organizing crime on a business model that spans the underworld and the upper world via criminally exploitable networks. It must be emphasized that the important thing about organized crime is not simply that it is organized and is a group activity in contrast with the unplanned and opportunistic crimes that are largely done by lone individuals. More important, its activities typically involve enterprise crimes such as drug-trafficking and construction rackets. As I have argued elsewhere, even more important and perhaps the main thing about organized crime is the relationships that it establishes, especially its relationship to power and to key institutions.[10] This is what makes it so corrupting and dangerous. In most countries of the world where powerful organized crime groups and networks have developed, this has been facilitated by often complex relationships between ordinary criminal gangs and the major political institutions. The gangs become key players in the process of political mobilization, in securing electoral victories and in consolidating power – often because of their hold on communities of the urban poor. Once in power, this relationship tends to lead to a flourishing of corruption and the plunder of the resources of the state.

An outcome of this process is that institutions vital to the proper functioning of the state are corrupted and become a part of the problem. Thus, 500 truckloads of illegally mined beach sand may disappear.[11] Some J$450 million in state funds may be defrauded without a conviction.[12] Hundreds of millions of dollars are extorted from businesses.[13] And hundreds of witnessed daylight murders remain unsolved every year.[14] The webs of criminally exploitable networks, the protective community shield, the links to key institutions, the weak systems of accountability within these organizations, the incapacity of law enforcement, and the access of criminal groups to power helps to explain these things.

The rise of organized crime may be considered one of the important developments because of the following:[15]

- Organized crime networks have made a successful business of crime including its entrepreneurial and violent predatory forms. An example of the first is drug trafficking and an example of the second is the extortion racket.

- There are approximately 20 organized crime groups in Jamaica and, according to the police, two hundred "gangs" but these organized crime groups tend to generate a contagious effect.[16] The lifestyles of their leaders advertise the success of crime. They are high-profile models of material success that others try to emulate.

- Replication does not only take the form of establishing new organized crime groups that operate at the high end of the illegal opportunity structure. It may also take the form of small groups of young men and even lone individuals demanding protection fees from the neighbourhood and village shop-keeper. And even more troubling, it has become a style of behaviour and an accompanying attitude set and mentality. This style of behaviour may be found, for example, among street hustlers. Extortionist practices in car parking

are now commonplace in Kingston. It is near impossible to park your car on the streets of downtown Kingston and parts of New Kingston without someone informing you that he has privatized the street and that you are required to pay for parking. Little villages on the outskirts of Kingston and even small towns in the hills of rural Jamaica are also faced with this problem of petty extortion and protection rackets. I have had the direct experience of a young man who fancied himself as the village gunman attempting to appoint himself protector of my home – for a monthly fee. The threat of violence yields money, and with minimal risk if done in a certain style. The spread of the mentality and behaviour patterns underlines the centrality of organized crime in the problem that we face and how structurally vulnerable the society is. It is a symptom of deep trouble.

- Organized crime groups are able to use their criminally acquired wealth to corrupt some of the key institutions of the country including the police force, elements in the state bureaucracy and the political parties.

- Such groups have helped to consolidate the crime–politics nexus as a mutually beneficial corrupt relationship. The garrison communities and constituencies are the most toxic expressions of this nexus.[17] They are safe havens for organized crime and safe seats for the political parties. Both sets of powerful actors therefore have an interest in preserving the garrisons. It is difficult to reliably control violent crime without an assault on the garrisons (the alternative is to appease the organized crime groups that "run" them by corruptly awarding these groups with lucrative state contracts) and difficult to do so without weakening the crime–politics nexus.

Organized crime is a major source of lethal violence. Violence is essential to its activities. Indeed, as I have repeatedly noted,

it has made a business of violence. This has fed into as well as tapped for its benefit the second feature of the situation, that is, the emergence of a subculture of violence.

Subculture of Violence

Subcultures of violence are characterized by sets of beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behaviour that are supportive of the use of violence especially to settle conflicts, avenge wrongs including assaults on one's honour, and to socialize the young. Some expressions of this development in Jamaica are:

- The extraordinarily high and increasing rate of murder and assault.[18]

- The character and style of the violence. Much of the lethal and sub-lethal violence in Jamaica is conflict-generated, and the rest is predatory and regulatory. I have discussed these categories and their relationships elsewhere and will return to the implications later. Regarding the style of the violence, the public debates have been most concerned with its "viciousness" or, to use the self-described term of the gunmen, "dog-heartedness". This viciousness is expressed in the disregard for the demographic profile of its targets, the use of body mutilation (as is, for example, reflected in the killing of children and beheading of adults and putting the heads on display) and the apparent gratuitous character of the acts of violence. These are its dramatic features or what I believe Friedrich Nietzsche would call its aesthetics. More importantly, the high rate, character and style of the violence points to changes in the sensibilities of the actors, their supporters and the passive third party observers. Perhaps the most dramatic expression of this change was reflected in the behaviour of a crowd of onlookers at the Kingston Public Hospital that encouraged Wayne Saunders, a patient at the hospital, to complete his attempt to commit suicide. They

taunted and cheered him on to jump to his death.[19] Such changed sensibilities find expression in greater approval of the use of violence in a wider range of circumstances and a more muted moral outrage even when existing boundaries and taboos that socially control the use of violence are breeched. In this situation, minority expressions of moral outrage simply reveal the impotence of the outraged. Of equal or even greater importance is the overtness of the violence, which signals a failure of law enforcement.[20]

- Widening geographic spread of this violence from Kingston to other urban areas.[21] For example, between 1994 and 2008, the homicide rate for St. James increased 6.9 times. In 2008 it was 116.5 incidents per 100,000 citizens.[22] The urban centres of St. Catherine and Clarendon are also problem zones. Violent crime has shadowed the process of secondary urbanization.

- The emergence and institutionalization of norms governing the use of violence such as revenge-taking, the code of silence, non-cooperation with law enforcement, that is, the subculture of violence.

Subcultures of violence are characterized by social approval of some forms of violence and the circumvention of the state. They involve a socialization of violence, the elaboration of norms governing its use which find approval among the people.

Tolerance of Some Types of Criminal Violence

Large sections of the Jamaican population are very ambivalent about some categories of crime including violent crime. Surveys of the attitudes of the population have consistently found that the majority of Jamaicans are very worried about the level of violent crime and have come to regard it as the most important social problem facing the country.[23] This has been so for perhaps

the last 20 years. Surveys also reveal that large minorities are approving of conflict crimes and are even tolerant of some categories of predatory crimes and of some of the activities of organized crime networks. Both conflict and predatory crimes may be tolerated by sections of the population but only if these activities are consistent with the rules of the subculture. The difficulty is when violent crimes become predatory in an undisciplined way and the targets and conduct of the predators are unpredictable. Then, these types of crime tend to generate great insecurity and panic. This is why there is such great concern with youth violence. It is less socialized, less habilitated and therefore less predictable.

Tolerance means that the power of negative social sanctions has been reduced. Those involved in violent behaviour patterns are less likely to be socially isolated. I estimate that approximately 25 per cent of a population is supportive of the use of violence in situations that would be legally criminal. Larger minorities are tolerant and even supportive of some of the activities of organized crime groups. For example, the Jamaican National Victimization Survey (2006) found that "43 per cent of those respondents who live in communities with Area Dons claimed that Dons had done positive things for their communities".[24] This tolerance has a material foundation in the services, including protective services, that organized crime groups provide the communities.

Jamaica has a weak state disciplinary system. As social and legal definitions of the kinds of behaviour that should be criminalized continue to diverge, the state system will become even weaker and participation in it reduced. This tendency is evidenced by the low reporting rates (only some 20 per cent of all crimes are reported to the police), and declining and low arrest and conviction rates for serious crimes. In 2007, the arrest rate for murder had declined to 34 per cent and the adjusted arrest rate is approximately 31 per cent.[25] The conviction rate, as noted

above, is now less than 10 per cent.[26]   The state system seems incapable of dealing with serious crimes, simple street crimes such as pick-pocketing and even misdemeanours and public order offences (littering the streets and urination in public). Jamaica has a weak state disciplinary system that is unable to ensure public order and to protect its citizens – especially its more vulnerable citizens (children, the aged, women, and inner-city residents). This is thus a state that is unable to fulfill some of its core functions.

The state system is weak and informal social control has been considerably weakened. They may be thought of as two systems, or two elements of a single braking system that puts a check on crime. They work best as a single system but both must be better linked if the high-violence communities are to be pacified and integrated. It may therefore seem that I am proposing a coupling of two weak systems (informal control and state legal control) that runs the risk of multiplying their weaknesses but this coupling is potentially a source of their mutual strength. Realizing this potential requires some measure of reform to the state system and contestation of the community subcultural norms and beliefs.

The crime problem is deep and broad. It is necessary to understand this. But these features present great difficulty for policy and strategy. Policy and strategy require a more precise and manageable definition of the problem. It is useful to identify the centre of gravity of the problem and to understand its dynamics. Identifying the centre of gravity of the problem does not necessarily mean that an appropriate strategy would involve a direct assault on its core. The state may not have the strength to do this. Puttering around at the edges of the problem may be a way of developing strength in order to eventually go for the heart of the problem. But these issues may be discussed openly only if the questions are posed.

I have identified organized crime and the emergence of a subculture of violence as the major developments of the post-independence period and the core issues today and from a short-

term perspective, organized crime is the heart of the problem and thus, for reasons already given, should be the primary target of any short-term measures.

These features of the crime situation point to:

- The vulnerability of the state and its weakness and incapacities specifically with regard to the control of violent crime. Weak and vulnerable states by definition have great difficulty fulfilling their core functions. This incapacity of the Jamaican state has profound implications for crime control strategy and particularly the limits on the effective use of force and the character of law enforcement reform. The law and law enforcement have limited authority and as may be expected in a subculture of violence, the beliefs and attitudes associated with the subculture have entered the police. For example, as I have noted elsewhere, in the high-violence areas, reporting conflicts to the police anticipates empathy and a waiving of negative sanctions when revenge is taken.

- Problems with the legitimacy of social structure. Historically, social norms have tended to travel down the social hierarchy via modelling. The poor will tend to mimic the rich and those in authority and leadership. They wish to enjoy a similar lifestyle via the socially approved channels for doing so or at least to be like the rich in those patterns of behaviour that are accessible. Social success and positions at the top of the social hierarchy are validated by a set of accepted principles governing means of achievement (work, entrepreneurship) and the socially accepted ends (wealth, power). Similarly, if the elite are perceived to be corrupt, criminality, particularly enterprise criminality, may be justified as the replication of the behaviour patterns of the elite. All success is based on illegality and corruption. This may not be the predominant view in the society but it is a significant and prevalent view

among marginalized youth and is exploited as justification for crime.

- The existence of an alternate opportunity structure. The violence problem can no longer be explained only in terms of deficits, of what we lack; that is, lack of opportunity, lack of parental attention, lack of socialization, lack of police, and so forth. The explanation must also include the presence of alternate socialization, alternate opportunity structures and alternate validation of behaviour. This is what the emergence of a subculture of violence means. The "dons" enjoy considerable referent power and the alternate opportunity structure which includes the system of income generating and status elevating violence is a source of it.

The above underpins a profound crisis of public safety that includes the incapacity of the state to effectively respond to the crime prevention and law enforcement challenges of the moment. Considerable efforts have been made by the police, by the government, by NGOs and by some international agencies. Much money has been spent on various social interventions in the inner-city communities. For example, in 2004 the NHT "committed J$7.5 billion" to its Inner City Housing Project.[27] Much more than this was actually spent to construct fewer units than were originally planned.[28] But some of this served to reinforce the corrupt relationships and the power of the criminal groups that dominate some of these communities. Thus, the problem seems intractable.

III
ISSUES OF STRATEGY

We may now try to answer the critical questions that should inform the development of policy and strategy. These are: what is the centre of gravity of the crime problem? Given the existing capacity, what is the most effective strategy? How does strategy enhance the capacity of the institutions that are primarily responsible for crime prevention and control and improve societal support for crime control? Put another way, how does one ensure that initial successes with crime control and institutional transformation do not precipitate resistance that is greater than the force for change but rather, strengthen the forces for more effective and democratic security. Strategy must help to create the conditions for its success. It entails the making of choices that affect these long-term outcomes and which anticipate and influence the environmental dynamics that are based on a sound understanding of the character of the problem.

The most efficient strategy would be one that targets the heart of the crime problem. If the body is viewed as a system, then the heart provides a critical and necessary function. If its functioning is impaired, then the functioning of the entire system is impaired. If it is removed, then the body dies unless a functional equivalent is found. We may apply this idea to the crime problem or, more specifically, the violence problem. This seems a useful targetting or goal setting principle. From this, an efficient strategy may be elaborated. This is a very direct approach to the problem.

It is my view that organized crime is at the centre of gravity of the Jamaican crime problem. I have provided the arguments elsewhere and will quickly summarize them here.[29] Organized crime has a demonstration effect. It provides powerfully attractive models of criminal success. It corrupts and corrodes

the institutions of law enforcement and the state. It corrupts the communities of the urban poor and promotes and enforces a code of silence that blocks the investigation of criminal activity. It cultivates relations of dependence on the proceeds of crime and therefore saps the will of the people to resist it. It is at the core of an expanding, self-perpetuating system that benefits and influences a wider range of powerful actors (police, lawyers, politicians, community activists and business people). Money and power buy immunity and facilitate more and more profitable crimes. Organized crime is the entrepreneurial money-making centre of violent crime. It has tended to spawn new groups and inspire the spread of predatory criminal mentalities and behaviour.

If, as I have argued, organized crime it at the heart of the Jamaican crime problem, and if it is also correct that a subculture of violence has emerged in the country, then my theoretical expectation is that the greatest short-term crime control return is to be had from making law enforcement more effective and more targetted. A crime control strategy that seeks to tackle the core problems should therefore initially have at its core, law enforcement.

Putting law enforcement at the core does not exclude coordinated social crime prevention programmes. These two elements are not to be treated as being mutually exclusive. It is the acute socioeconomic problems that gave rise to the processes which have led to this juncture. But policy must respond to the present, not the situation at an earlier stage. Prior to this juncture, I and many other researchers emphasized the need for social crime prevention and institutional reform. This remains an important element of strategy. However, just as law enforcement may not always be the lead element in responding to crime (its response set may be too limited to deal with youth violence), so social crime prevention may not always be the lead element. In some contexts such as urban Jamaica today it may

be nullified by the power of territorially entrenched organized crime. To have the same solutions regardless of context and the changing character of the problem suggests ideological closure, a terrible lack of imagination, or both.

Getting to the Heart of the Problem – A Direct Approach

A direct assault on organized crime would involve the following elements. The first is to relieve the perpetrators of their assets. Money and wealth are not the only sources of their power and influence but they are a primary source. Separated from their wealth and sources of illegal income, the dons would no longer be the attractive models of success they now are. This separation is not as difficult as it appears and does not require that a lot of operationally dedicated resources be provided by the state. Indeed, if successful, the wealth of the dons could add to the resources available to the state. The second element involves weakening the relationships between these groups and the political parties and elements in the state bureaucracy by targetting the sites of access and partnership that are used to raid resources of the state via contracts. I believe that this is a more productive way of dealing with the relationships between state actors and criminal networks than to focus on the social ties between these two sets of actors. Third, if the above two aspects are successful and the enterprise activity of the networks is disrupted, the relationships with their base communities may deteriorate and some of these groups may become more predatory. Predatory criminality isolates the criminal networks (depending on the targets) while enterprise criminality embeds them. The goal would be to shift the power balance against the organized crime networks nationally and within their host communities. Consolidation of these new power relations in which the organized crime groups are subordinated would involve expunging their representatives from the local and

national power circuits and would require additional measures (some of which may be best achieved by political rather than legal measures). In this context, social intervention projects and programmes that target the host communities are potentially more helpful in further weakening the power and influence of the crime networks.

More responsive and effective law enforcement may undermine the support that is derived from the policing and protective services offered by the crime networks to their communities. But more is initially required in terms of law enforcement. For example, properly organized politically unbiased avocational policing may help with the consolidation of new power relationships in the high-violence communities by providing a 24-hour, seven day per week policing presence in these communities after the armed power of the dons has been broken by the professional police. Voluntary avocational policing in the form of the National Home Guard has been mal-administered in the past but there is no good reason why it could not be re-engineered and an appropriate form for the current situation found.[30] We should learn from our past, not become prisoners to it.

These are the kinds of process-oriented, problem-solving that may yield long-term success. After the control of organized crime and the short- and medium-term goals have been achieved, a residual of predatory criminality and conflict violence will remain. Moreover, the externally held assets and operations of the organized crime networks provide a basis for their recovery from any initial assault on these groups in Jamaica (just as the assault on them by law enforcement in the USA and UK a decade ago led to a retreat, recovery and recrudescence in Jamaica). We should therefore not act alone. Cooperation with external law enforcement agencies should be deepened without us becoming overly reliant or dependent on them for support within Jamaica. But even then, there would still be the local

problem of a subculture of violence. Any violence prevention and control project is thus a long-haul, multi-stage project. I do not use the word project in the administrative sense but rather as a goal-set.

Success would have consequences which may not be all positive. There are risks. It is difficult to say what a successful campaign against entrepreneurial crimes would mean in economic and political terms. However, what is evident is that a successful campaign against organized crime would have the effect of reducing the supply of drug money to the national economy. We do not have a good estimate of the size of the contribution of drug money to the economy but from the annual estimates of the volume of cocaine transshipped and ganja exported there is every indication that the contribution to the economy is significant. Reduced supply of these funds would have some impact on the stability of the exchange rate and thus poverty rates. A negative economic impact would be expected in the construction sector, which is reputed to be a beneficiary of drug money. The contraction of this sector would mean job losses for young, unskilled urban males – the subpopulation that is most given to violence. Community patronage and welfare programmes run by the dons would be cut. While, as has already been noted, this would decrease their influence and increase their vulnerability to police action, it would also lead to increased petty predatory criminality and perhaps greater violence. The political fall-out of disrupted systems of welfare and protection in the communities of the urban poor is difficult to anticipate but there would be greater demands on the state system. Thus, there is a price attached to any success in crime control that truly alters the fundamentals.

In the Jamaican context, crime control involves a trade-off that some of us may not be willing to make. This is the problem of wills – civic and political – in their less malevolent forms. I estimate that a success against organized crime followed

by robust law enforcement (not crime fighting) could have the medium-term effect of reducing the murder rate to approximately 20–25 incidents per 100,000. The socioeconomic problems in their direct impact do not sufficiently explain rates that are much higher than this. Some 900 lives would be saved annually but many millions of dollars from the drug trade would be lost.[31] This is the short-term price. The long-term payoff is stability, safety and a better environment for legitimate economic activity.

Crime control strategies involve political risks of a national order. The political risks are based on the factors just discussed. If crime control inflicts short-term damage on the economy, then there are political consequences. This is an important aspect of the material foundation of the problem of political and civic will or seeming lack of resolve to deal effectively with the crime problem. Any administration that successfully weakens and controls organized crime and, as a consequence, weakens its links with gunmen who still are able to retain their power and influence in the communities, must also consider its impact on their electoral prospects. They would no longer have the services of the gunmen and could not rely on the police for reliable protection against the gunmen in service of their opponents. The successful administration would thus be exposed and vulnerable to these developments unless both sides agree not to exploit whatever political opportunities and advantages might be created.

> *Unilateral disengagement from corruption, crime and political violence is politically problematic. This explains the difficulty in achieving two-party consensus on a programme of change. Crime control becomes a part of a larger political game in which no one wants to give up the opportunity to use crime and the problems of crime control for their political advantage.*

Working from the Edges – An Indirect Approach

A good strategy must be based on the realities, that is, on what is given. Otherwise, it may be a good strategy for elsewhere – not for Jamaica. It may have to assume the absence of political consensus. It must assume the ambivalence of the people towards some categories of crime. It must take as given a generally under-resourced and ineffective police force. And it must seek to change these things for the better, not promote complaints about them after the fact as excuses for avoiding accountability. This means that a strategy that goes directly to the heart of the problem may not work. The direct attack is not always best – unless one is confident of one's strengths and the weaknesses of the target. There is an alternate approach. One may achieve the desired strategic goals in less direct ways. I am not given to using military imagery and language in discussions of crime but this is a kind of guerilla tactic that is usually adopted by relatively weak actors.

In the words of the military historian, Liddell Hart,

> In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.[32]

There is a credible case for the "longest way round". The strategic goals would be no different from those of the direct approach. The indirect approach would involve patiently and systematically controlling corruption especially in law enforcement, politics and the administration of the state as these are the institutions where the key relationships on which organized crime thrive are formed. These relationships make high-end crimes a low-risk, high-reward activity. They facilitate crime and stimulate criminality within and outside of the institutions. Prevention measures that make contract

granting more transparent and accountable, such as requiring all state agencies to post all contracts and contractors to post all subcontracts on the websites of the contracting agency within one month of the contract being awarded, may help to contain the problem and demonstrate to the public that solutions are possible.

High-end crime and organized crime may be tackled on a case-by-case basis (as opposed to a group or mass basis) initially targetting the most vulnerable networks and scoring small victories, exhibiting political and class impartiality, greater competence and firmer resolve. The networks and the violence may be approached community by community and hot spot by hot spot. This is similar to what is being done now, but should be pursued more systematically and effectively. Most of all, it must be done in a manner that builds momentum and public support. In this way, it might be possible to build confidence in law enforcement and get people to believe that a campaign against high-end crime can be won. A survey conducted in August 2006 by the Centre for Leadership and Governance at The University of the West Indies, Mona campus, revealed that only 13 per cent of the population felt that the "war against crime and delinquency in Jamaica was being won".[33] Some 85 per cent felt that this "war" was being lost or, at best, was not being won. Instilling public confidence is thus an uphill battle that will turn on the performance of the institutions and programmes. The simple idea is that by small, successful steps one creates better conditions for future actions that may be bolder and more clearly directed at the primary targets of the strategy. These measures that are directed at the crime and disorder would thus be accompanied by reform of law enforcement and the justice system. If successful, the measures permit a shift to the more direct approach.

Beyond the problem of organized crime, tackling the softer public order issues affords opportunities for quick and

relatively easy successes of great symbolic value by making the law more respected and authoritative. Public order successes would strengthen law enforcement and signal seriousness and resolve. Modest successes may also yield greater confidence in the institutions of the criminal justice system and less tolerance of crime.

As has been noted, strategy must be anchored in an understanding of the character of the problem faced. In the sketches above I have tried to do just that. But more than this is required. Strategy should be derived from a coherent policy that is also informed by a set of values and which may find expression as "models". Mathematics does not have a monopoly on the use of this word. By "model" is meant a set of relationships between goals and means, anchored in a hierarchy of values and a clear logic that is theoretically informed. If the above strategies are viewed as being primarily process options, they must be given greater content. These content options are described as models. In the next section we will explore these models.

IV
RESPONSES TO THE CRIME PROBLEM –
THE OPTIONS AS MODELS

The official responses to the crime problem have lagged behind the changes in the nature of the problem. As discussed earlier, since Independence, we have had two major turning points in the evolution of the crime problem. The first was the turn to violence which has progressed to the emergence of a subculture of violence (which should be regarded as another turn). The second is the commercialization of crime and the development of an illegal opportunity structure that extends beyond our national borders into global markets and which we associate with the rise of organized crime. Despite some useful efforts by successive governments that included the development of a national security policy, we are yet to have a clearly articulated policy response to these developments.[34]

We are just beginning to implement social crime prevention programmes in the high-violence communities, the impetus for which again came from the outside via the IADB. We have been very late in recognizing that our criminal justice system is in need of reform. We have had attempts at police and prison reform, and more lately reform of the justice system. In recent times, police reform has been most consistently pursued. There, reform may be described as a modernization turn, which should have begun 40 years ago immediately after Independence. Now there is an attempt to add a new dimension to reform, that is, a change in the style of policing to Community-Based Policing. Community-Based Policing has its origins in Team Policing which was experimented with in the USA over 30 years ago in the 1970s. We have lagged in understanding the changes in the local environment and in keeping abreast of international developments in the fields of police and justice sector reform. A similar story could be told in the correctional services. Most of all, we lag in implementation.

The lag in the implementation of agreed plans is often viewed as a matter of political will. As I have already suggested, there is some validity to this argument. But it may be overstated. There is a real problem of state capacity. I have seen first-hand instances of very strong political will to have measures implemented, only to be followed by implementation failure. The truth is that the work methods are poor. The mental application that is required for problem-solving in implementation is poor. Lower level, poorly paid operatives are often distracted by the difficulties of coping with the challenges of everyday life and, at times, the competence levels are not adequate to the tasks. These are things that can be fixed but the political cost of fixing them may be too high.

> *Jamaica has a weak criminal justice system. The consequence of state failure in this sphere is that people seek alternatives. Indeed, the emergence of alternatives in the field of criminal justice is perhaps the most profound expression of a more general state of things. People tend to complain about the poor services and the abuses of power but accept the institutions – so long as they do not see alternatives.*

It is very difficult to imagine alternatives to the police and the courts or even alternate styles of policing and alternate methods of justice. Alternatives to these institutions only emerge under very difficult conditions such as the more than 20 consecutive years of high levels of violence that some of the urban communities have experienced. Under these conditions they adapt and solve problems by developing alternatives such as the jungle courts, which mimic the state system. This development should signal an opportunity for institutional change and to better meet the needs of the people. We will explore these options.

Criminologists have identified different "models" of crime prevention and control. These include but are not limited to the crime control and the social justice models.[35] The discussion is limited to these two models because they have been applied in Jamaica and because they were/are both based on state policy. (There have been some important non-state violence prevention efforts but an assessment of these activities is beyond the scope of this lecture. Their importance justifies a separate, dedicated study). These models are not mutually exclusive. They simply state different policy emphases and thrusts. They may be regarded as ideal types. In reality, there is perhaps no pure type and overlaps between models should be expected. These overlaps may reveal inconsistencies, incoherence and even contradictory goals that account for the ineffectiveness of some of these models. Such inconsistencies may be political outcomes as governments must respond to different groups that may push for different policies. Good models will be attuned to the character of the problem and the capacity of the implementing institutions will respond to both the root and proximate causes of the problem and improve public safety without compromising democratic values.

Figure 1 depicts the different state-led models that have been attempted in Jamaica and the integrated model that is suggested here.

Figure 1.
Crime Prevention and Control Models

The Crime Control Model

Criminologists make a distinction between crime control and crime prevention. This, in turn, rests on the distinction between crime and criminality. The first refers to the event. The second refers to a kind of behaviour, that is, the tendency to behave criminally. Crime control targets crime (the event). Crime prevention targets criminality (the sources of the behaviour pattern). We therefore associate crime control with the management of the problem. It expects that good management of crime as event will contain and deter by the fear of detection and punishment. Crime control approaches tend to take criminality as a given, even as naturalized, as being anchored in human nature.[36] On this perspective, as a general rule, engineering of the social environment is not expected to have much of an impact on criminality. Crime must be controlled primarily by law enforcement measures, by the efficient arrest and conviction of criminals.

Advocates of the model tend to go beyond this by suggesting that the entire criminal justice system should work for this common goal (the arrest and conviction of criminals). This tends to set the model in conflict with due process and the basic rights that are associated with this. Thus, it follows from this approach that the justice system should not be a check on the activities of the police. It should, for example, yield on *habeas corpus* and be more restrictive in granting bail, be a bit more indifferent to the methods by which evidence is collected and perhaps even be lenient on police officers who violate the criminal laws in their pursuit of criminals. This approach may stretch the limits of liberal democracy and the rule of law.

This model emphasizes the primacy of order over other political values. In extreme cases it may disregard some individual freedoms and due process rights. It sets a lower threshold for how much crime a society is able to tolerate than an approach that emphasizes due process and individual rights.

The overarching principle of the relationship between the individual and society is always resolved as societal primacy. In support of this position, threats tend to be magnified and the fragility of the society in question exaggerated.

Measures of the extent of popular support for the kind of values hierarchy and choices that are promoted by the advocates of the model are presented in Figure 2. When the choices are presented as support for more order versus more freedom, 43 per cent supported "more order" (see Figure 2). This is a large minority that is likely to grow if the security situation continues to deteriorate. A further probing of this data set revealed that while the society was divided, the patterns of support for "more order" over "more rights" were not socially polarizing. There were no significant differences between genders although women tended to be the "more order" oriented. Citizens with tertiary education were, as expected, more freedom- and rights-oriented, but the differences in the levels of support for more order, when cross-tabulated by educational levels, were not great. Support for order over freedom seems to be taking a social consensus pattern. This means that all groups are split on the relative weight to be given to the political values discussed above including the powerful and the relatively less powerful (a paralyzing moment). As the situation deteriorates, however, a majority may be formed and is likely to be formed with a similar consensus rather than socially polarizing pattern.

The available data suggest that contrary to popular perceptions, at this level of abstraction, these issues are therefore not viewed as being associated with particular interests (such as the middle strata versus the poor) but rather as disputes over national policies and honest interpretations of the national interest. It does not, however, follow that political consensus may easily be arrived at (policy matters are more concrete). Differences by political affiliation varied more considerably, with pro-PNP respondents being more supportive of "more

order". This was at a time when their party was still in power. It is likely that supporters of the governing party will tend to be more order-supportive and supporters of the opposition party will be more rights-supportive. These data help us to better understand the mixed signals from the population and the political leaders and the associated stalemate on crime control policy.

Figure 2. "Do you believe it is better to live in an orderly society where certain freedoms are limited, or in a society where all rights and freedoms are respected although there may be less order as a result?"

	Frequency	Percent
More order	578	43.2
More rights and freedom	716	53.5
Don't know/No answer	44	3.3
Total	1338	100.0

Source: Powell 2007, pp. 18.

This model is grounded in deterrence theory. Deterrence refers to the prevention of crime that results from the fear of punishment. The idea that the fear of pain is a useful instrument of control is still a very popular one. People, for example, support and admire the police special squads and individual "crime-

fighters" because they "drive fear in the hearts of the criminals". Deterrence is in turn based on rational choice theory, which finds its early expression in the classical school of criminology and particularly in the work of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.[37] The criminal offender is seen as a free and rational actor who chooses crime as a means to acquire the desired material and symbolic goods. This rational decision-making is based on a calculation of the likely rewards and risks of offending. Consistent with this, its penological doctrine stresses individual responsibility and punishment or fear of pain as deterrence.

This approach has a strong appeal to common sense. Indeed, it is taken-for-granted. Its taken-for-grantedness is evident in the popular and official responses when it fails to reduce crime. The response to its failure is typically that the applications or measures taken are not severe enough. When tougher measures are taken with similar results, the process is repeated. The approach becomes progressively punitive and may even disregard the law, revise the laws in service of the model, or both. The arguments and the process become circular and closed to critical examination.

This rational actor view of the criminal, it is argued, ignores the social constraints on the individual. It is thus criticized for presenting an "undersocialized" view of humans and presenting the criminal as an independent actor who is unshaped and unconstrained by his or her social environment.

Despite its punitive appeal and neglect of the social environment, placed historically, the theoretical foundations of this model were erected by reformers who attempted to limit the harsh pre-Enlightenment regime of crime control and punishment in Europe during the eighteenth century. Cesare Beccaria argued that crime control policy and the system of punishment in particular ought to command "the rational adherence and support of the citizens." And rational citizens, he claimed, would only agree to "such punishments that would

benefit them by reducing crime".[38]   The theory thus limits the severity of punishment to only that which is sufficient to reduce crime – and no more. If, for example, life sentences had an equal deterrent effect as capital punishment, then, it would be argued, the rational citizen ought not to permit capital punishment.

The crime control model may evolve in different directions. It may become more disciplined by due process or alternatively, it may take what may be called a "crime-fighting" direction. The distinction between the two turns on the relative place of security and individual rights in their respective hierarchy of values. The key principles of due process are the protection of individuals from injustice and ensuring that the innocent are not convicted. It is grounded in the overarching principle of the rule of law and the idea that there should be substantive and procedural limitations on governmental power and, moreover, that crime control should be subordinated to these principles. It is willing to make trade-offs between crime rates and the preservation of these basic principles. Individual rights are primary. Here in Jamaica we have due process but not as a model in the sense that we are using the term. The lack of respect for procedural rights (prior to charges being laid), the reluctance to redress the abuses suffered by citizens, the high police case-loads and court overload all indicate that this is not the central thrust of policy. Here, due process simply places some limits on the crime-fighting model. Crime fighting argues for a different trade-off that makes the crime control outcomes primary. It is more concerned with crime control effectiveness than with justice. From the perspective of this model, and contrary to the view of the American philosopher John Rawls, justice is clearly not "the first virtue of social institutions".[39]

The directional influences on the model are environmental (the rates and character of the crime problem), institutional (police capacity and culture, internal and external systems of accountability), and ideological (the extent of popular

commitment to democratic values and the strength and willingness of civil society and opposition groups to demand fidelity to these values). Thus, for example, after the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 9/11, the American government adopted a counter-terrorism strategy that deemphasized due process and indeed the rule of law in its treatment of non-Americans. Foreign suspects were approvingly tortured and held in indefinite detention without charges being brought against them. In this permissive international environment, some Central American countries that were or are faced with very serious crime problems seized the opportunity to intensify "mano duro" crime-fighting policies that assaulted basic human rights. In particular, very questionable gang control laws were passed and vigilante policing winked at. Here in Jamaica an attempt was made to make a case that Jamaican criminality was a special type of terrorism as justification for a consolidation of the crime-fighting model.[40]

Crime control is not synonymous with "get tough" policies but in the Jamaican context it has been. And get tough crime control policies may become "crime fighting". Crime control becomes crime fighting when it disregards basic democratic rights (*habeas corpus*, freedom of association, freedom of movement, and freedom from arbitrary arrest), the law and the accountability of the police to it. It upholds these practices, not as exceptional measures that are temporarily adopted during exceptional times but as normal, routine policing. There is an undemocratic impulse in crime fighting. We have largely experienced the crime control model as crime fighting and so will discuss it as such.

Crime fighting has been the main thrust of the response to crime since Independence. The commitment to and application of the model was and is reflected in the policy signals from successive political administrations, legislation passed, police organization and behaviour, and public support for the model.

The first post-Independence signals of acceptance of reduced police accountability to law were sent in the 1960s by the then prime minister, Hugh Shearer. His injunction to the police was "read them (criminal suspects) no beatitudes".[41] Later in the 1970s and immediately after what came to be known as the "Green Bay Massacre", the then minister of national security, Dudley Thompson, declared that, "No angels died at Green Bay".[42] The suggestion was that the society should give a wink and a nod to the killing of criminal suspects that were allegedly given to the use of gun violence. Similarly, intemperate speeches have been made in more recent times (thankfully by lower level officials), usually at the funerals of police officers killed by gunmen. There has been continuity across political administrations as these ideas represent a strong current in the political elite, the population and the police service. Borrowing from the language of the Holocaust, a former senior police officer even called for a "final solution" to the crime problem.[43]

This approach has informed the legislative responses to crime, sentencing practices and modes of policing. Jamaica's colonial legacy included an array of state-protective rather than citizen-protective legislation. The extensive powers conferred on the police during colonialism have been further extended since Independence.[44] The Suppression of Crimes Act (1974) provided the legal setting that emboldened the police to search without warrants, arrest without reason and detain without charge. Arrest thus came to be extensively used by the police as an investigative tool. Jamaicans lived under this act for 14 years, from 1977 to 1993.

Taken together, the laws placed great restrictions on the discretion of judges and imposed much harsher punishments. The Dangerous Drugs Act (1974) stipulated harsher penalties for narcotics offences. The Gun Court Act (1974) sought a sentence of indefinite detention for the possession of illegal firearms and or ammunition and deprivation of the right to trial by jury. It succeeded in securing the latter. An amendment to the Act

in 1976 imposed life imprisonment for firearm offences. The Juveniles Act (1974) subjected young (over 14 years) gun use offenders to similarly criminalizing processes as adults (with the effect that children under 14 years are now increasingly being used in gun offences).[45] The Offenses Against the Person Act (1992), while categorizing some murders as non-capital, had as its real intent the resumption of hanging.

Some of the bills that were passed such as the Proceeds of Crime Act (2007), the Corruption Prevention Act (2005) and the Money Laundering Act (1996) were crafted with clear targets and specific objectives in mind (to control drug trafficking). These acts are justifiable and useful.

However, the effect of most of the laws listed above and some of the more recent ones such as the Terrorism Prevention Act (2003–2004), and the newly proposed Act to Amend the Parole Act, Act to Amend the Bail Act, and the Act to Make Interim Provision Extending the Powers of Arrest and Detention under sections 50B and 50F of the Constabulary Force Act, was to extend the powers of the police, encroach on the rights of the citizen, widen the range of criminalized acts, reduce access to bail (the new act allows the suspension of bail for 60 days) and facilitate the imposition of harsher sanctions.

Sentencing practices are revealed in the rates of imprisonment. The imprisonment rates and ranking of the countries of the region are reported in Table 1. Five Caribbean countries ranked in the top ten countries with the highest imprisonment rates. Jamaica ranked 50 among the 176 countries included in the ranking with a rate of 182 per 100,000 citizens.[46] Jamaica's rate of imprisonment increased from approximately 150 per 100,000 in 1977 to 240 per 100,000 in 1993,[47] and has since declined.[48] Jamaica's relatively low imprisonment rate corresponds with the low conviction rates. However, the imprisonment rate excludes persons in jails and remand centres. It therefore misrepresents the true situation as many prisoners spend considerable periods of time in jails

and remand centres. If these were to be included the rate would be significantly altered.

Table 1.
Incarceration Rates for Selected Caribbean Countries, 2007
(per 100,000 citizens)

Country	Rate	Change	Rank
St. Kitts and Nevis	547	+	4
Belize	487	+	7
Cuba	487		6
Bahamas	462	+	8
Dominica	419	=	10
Barbados	367	-	11
St. Vincent*	312		21
St. Lucia	303		22
Trinidad and Tobago	269	-	23
Grenada	265		30
Antigua and Barbuda	225		39
Guyana	199		46
Jamaica	182		53
Dominican Republic	143		69
Haiti	43		157

Source: *Human Development Report 2007/2008.*

Note: * St. Vincent and the Grenadines
i) + means an increase since 2004, – means a decrease, and = means no notable change.
ii) The Jamaica figure differs from that computed from data reported in the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* – an official publication of the government of Jamaica.

Jamaicans tend to have a very punitive orientation as is evidenced by the extent to which they support capital punishment, the strength of the revenge motive and support of vigilantism, all of which have been repeatedly measured. This punitiveness applies to serious crimes. It is, however, tempered by notions of giving first offenders who have committed less serious crimes a second chance. This attitude finds expression in

the justice system as a willingness to use non-institutionalizing punishments for minor offences. While popular attitudes seem to have an impact on the system of "corrections", empirical social science research is yet to make its mark on policy. For example, we know from research on Jamaica that while imprisonment deters violent crimes, length of sentences tends to increase it.[49] In its application, the model is not informed by this kind of evidential support. It thus employs none of these kinds of subtleties.

Police organization

The style and organization of policing have been consistent with the crime control model. It is now in a process of change but has been reactive and paramilitary. At a certain level of generality, a unity of purpose, symmetry of style has prevailed across the various component institutions of the justice system.

Crime fighting methods are most evidently expressed in the style and activities of the police special squads. The Flying Squad of colonial origin was perhaps the prototype for these groups. Several special squads that patrol the streets and perform general policing functions (not to be confused with those that perform specialist functions) have been established. This was accelerated in the early 1970s when the legal instruments for crime fighting were established and or invoked – such as the Suppression of Crimes Act. The Ranger Squad, the Eradication Squad, Anti-crime Investigative Detachment (ACID), Special Anti-Crime Task Force (SACTF) and the Crime Management Unit are examples of these units. The Crime Management Unit was involved in two mass killings (four or more persons killed) of criminal suspects that discredited the country internationally and led to criminal charges being laid against its operational leadership and to the unit being disbanded. Some special squads remain active but have reduced visibility.

Police behaviour

If from the pattern of behaviour of the special squads one may infer that crime fighting has been official policy, the failure to discipline the members and commanders of these groups or even to publicly condemn their legal violations may be taken as confirmatory. During the 1970s, the Green Bay incident in which the military ensnared and killed five young men was one of the worst manifestations of this policy. The incident, which occurred in 1976, clearly revealed the extra-legal side of crime fighting and its approval by elements in the political administration.[50] It was an important aspect of policy. There was further progression in the 1980s, which was the period of the highest number and rate of police killings (see Table 2).

Table 2. Police Killings 1978-2008 (rate per 100,000)

Year	Number	Rate
1978	167	8.0
1980	234	10.9
1982	236	10.9
1984	355	15.6
1986	179	7.7
1988	181	7.7
1990	135	5.6
1992	145	5.9
1994	100	4.0
1996	148	5.9
1998	145	5.7
2000	149	5.8
2002	154	5.9
2004	131	5.0
2006	229	8.6
2007	272	10.2

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force.

It is believed that this policy accounted for the greater control of the murder rate in the 1980s. It thus finds continued support within the political elite. Every decade has its worst expressions of the policy. The Braeton and Kraal killings are two of its better-known manifestations in the 1990s and 2000s.[51] These excesses strengthen oppositionist tendencies but eventually there is a lapse into established behaviour patterns and the crime-fighters once again become heroic figures that enjoy popular support from a fearful public. By the mid-2000s, police killings were beginning to approximate the peak of the early 1980s. The model is very resilient.

The crime control model, in its more legally and socially restrained forms, triumphed internationally in the 1980s when it held undisputed sway in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The "three strikes" policy, the increased rates of imprisonment that followed, and the increase in police numbers and budgets were features of this period. At the time of writing this lecture, the prison population in America approximated the population of Jamaica. In 2007, some 2.293 million Americans were in prisons and another 780,581 were in jails in their country.[52] The reduction in crime rates in many American cities gave some credence to the claims of success. Similar policies and investments in law enforcement in the United Kingdom during the Thatcher period (1979–1990) did not yield similar crime control results. Between 1979 and 1990, the British increased their police recruitment by 15 per cent and yet there was a 79 per cent increase in reported crime.[53]

As others have noted, this approach to the crime problem triumphed as policy partly because of the social policy failures of the previous period which precipitated what the British criminologist Jock Young called the "etiological crisis" in criminology.[54] In the United Kingdom, living standards were rising, unemployment and poverty rates falling and yet the crime rates were increasing. This is somewhat similar to what has

more recently been happening in Trinidad and Tobago where (until the time of writing when early adjustments to the global economic crisis are taking place) there is a booming petro-carbon economy, greater equality of opportunity and "workfare" programmes that have reduced the unemployment rate to 7 per cent (2007).[55] Yet, the murder rate has been rapidly increasing and the country is troubled by other forms of predatory crime such as kidnapping. The etiological crisis described above was similar to the crisis in the penal systems, which was characterized by the apparent failure of rehabilitation and other reformative programmes.[56] These experiences tend to strengthen the view (worldwide) that social crime prevention and penal reformism that is intended to promote new forms of secondary prevention are unnecessary and that policing and punishment are what matter regardless of context.[57]

In the Jamaican context, the triumph of the model has been facilitated by its intuitive appeal and strong situationally conditioned views that are supportive of it. The majority of the population has been and remains, for example, supportive of police vigilantism. They are, however, also against abuses when these are misdirected, excessive, unacknowledged and unaccompanied by redress. In the Jamaican context, these complex attitudes and the cross-pressures from a differentiated public may in some situations encourage and in others constrain the crime-fighting approach.

Some Weaknesses of the Crime Control Model

The crime control model and particularly its crime-fighting variant suffer from a number of weaknesses that are internal to the model itself, not problems of implementation. First, it focusses on removing the offender from the streets. However, removing the offender from the street (by imprisonment or death) "reduces crime, only if the crimes leave the street with the offender".[58] This is the replacement problem that always

confronts crime fighting and crime control more generally. If killing or otherwise removing the leaders and associates of territorially-based crime groups is taken as an important aspect of the solution to the problem of violent crime, then their replacement by new dons (the problem of criminality) would lead to an endless chain of killings. I make this argument because given the highly criminogenic environment, there would be an endless supply of criminals as long as criminality is not a target of policy.

This is particularly instructive in dealing with organized crime groups. Killing and extraditing dons who are engaged in enterprise crimes such as drug trafficking "only creates a protective tariff" for those willing to continue in the crime businesses.[59] Increasing the risks involved in high-end crime only attracts new players who are attracted by high-risk activity and who are likely to be more violent in protecting their business from competitors and law enforcement. The violent removal of the leaders of organized crime groups therefore usually results in increased violence. This is especially true once an elaborate illegal opportunity structure has been established – as is the case in Jamaica.

There are even greater risks associated with the use of repressive crime-fighting measures. These may lead to worse forms of crime. Criminals adapt to the changing conditions that they face including the opportunities and the attempts to manipulate the risks that they face. One response is to generate new risks for law enforcement and the victims of predatory crimes. Let me first illustrate the possible effects of illegal repressive measures in dealing with political resistance using an example from elsewhere. Although the problem and context is different, it illustrates the general point. The use of torture by the Israelis against Palestinian youth who attacked their patrols in the occupied territories made the Palestinian youth into heroes on their return to their communities. The Israelis sought to solve

this problem by relying on methods that would humiliate.[60] No one makes heroes of the victims of sexualized humiliation. I am speculating here but one result of these new forms of torture may have been increased suicide bombings. The general point also applies to ordinary criminality. As Jeremy Bentham noted in 1809, "the most savage banditti are always to be found under laws the most severe, and it is no more than what might be expected. The fate with which they are threatened hardens them to the sufferings of others as well as their own"... [61]

Crime and crime control, criminal and state agents interact and influence each other in various ways. Lawless (or simply successful) suppression of entrepreneurial crimes may result in increased predatory crimes. Suppression of the drug trade may simply displace these activities and result in protection rackets, kidnapping and other crimes. I suspect that this is what is now happening in Jamaica. A shift may be occurring in the relative proportion of entrepreneurial and predatory crimes in favour of the latter. I am yet to carefully check the data for 2007 and 2008 so this is impressionistic. Any such change is likely to increase the feelings of insecurity in the country (even if it is accompanied by a lower homicide rate).

The crime control impact of the model is usually at best short-term. Increased police density, increased arrests, increased incarceration all tend to have short-term deterrent effects. The long-term effects on crime, police and polity tend to be more problematic. As already discussed, the adaptations by violent criminals may present even greater difficulties for the society. Corrupt methods weaken the commitment to police accountability. Increased distrust of the institutions by the public and political actors on matters of law enforcement may make cooperation difficult when it is most needed. In the case of Jamaica, no government is trusted (by the Opposition) to call a state of emergency. The society is disarmed by the earlier abuses of power and present distrust. Abuses educe reactions and these

reactions occur not just within the political class and the public but also within the criminal justice system. Institutional actors within the latter may respond with an inflexible legalism that is indifferent to changes in the character of the crime problem and slow to respond to public safety crises.

Advocates of the model fail to understand that effective social control is largely based on trust, confidence and legitimacy of the social structure and the state systems. Given the colonial legacy of Jamaica, it is unlikely that there was a golden era when the criminal justice system enjoyed high levels of public confidence.[62] A consequence of the model is that it may have further diminished the low level of public confidence in the system. A survey that was conducted by a team of researchers led by Lawrence Powell of the Centre for Leadership and Governance at The University of the West Indies found that less than 10 per cent of the population had "a lot of confidence" in the police, the judiciary, and the parliament/legislature.[63] For the crime-fighting model to have a chance of returning even short-term results in conditions of crisis requires consensus. In normal situations it generates division and political/social conflict. Low trust and confidence make consensus difficult, especially on measures that would increase the powers of distrusted institutions. However, there are still some possibilities. In some societies consensus may be generated around security threats that are external or externalized. For example, the terrorist attack on the United States of America on 9/11 led to popular support within that country for the deprivation of rights (of foreigners) and the allocation of increased resources to "homeland security". During crime waves, ordinary criminality may be externalized as the activity of new migrants and the native population is thereby made to feel that the rights-disregarding measures are directed at the "foreigner" within their borders, not at them. In Jamaica, externalization does not have much prospect (despite the presence of deportees). Moreover, in the absence of an external threat, the social and political divisions

remain sharp. It is therefore difficult to achieve consensus. The model is thus ineffective and generates conflict especially when it tries to extend itself (as in the Green Bay, Kraal and Braeton events).

The taken-for-grantedness of the model has made it a closed system of ideas that is often reinforced by its practical failures. Failure results in calls for more to be done within the framework of the model: an extension of police powers; harsher punishment; more resources; more public support. All of this has political and commonsense appeal that makes it difficult to see beyond it. In conditions that are unfavourable to it, the model thus tends to fall into an ineffectiveness trap.

Another difficulty with the crime control model is that it is unlikely to positively contribute to the integration and transformation of the high-violence inner-city communities. It deals with the marginalization of the urban poor in ways that reinforce their marginalization. It responds or rather reacts with disregard for the rights of the people. This, in turn, reinforces the alienation and subcultural responses. The model may therefore manage the problem but is unlikely to break the dynamics of the violence.

The crime fighting model has been a general failure. Where there is a serious problem of exclusion and marginalization and systems of law enforcement are weak, tough measures may result in increased disregard for the system, resistance in many forms (including non-cooperation by sub-populations) and thus even greater ineffectiveness. However, it must be conceded that where these systems are strong, the crime control model and even crime fighting may yield short- and medium-term control gains. There has been considerable effort at making the model more robust. It may be worthwhile exploring what this involves as this may help to clarify the extent to which its ineffectiveness is due to problems of implementation, its internal logic or both.

Extending the Model

Earlier, I cautioned that advocates of the crime control model tend to seek reward for its failure. If, for example, the arrest and conviction rates are poor, then more investigators and more and better surveillance and forensics equipment are demanded. As a pattern of thought it may be extended to other issues. Thus, if the level of corruption is high, salaries should be increased. These improvements may be necessary; the difficulty is that in the absence of institutional transformation they have not and are unlikely to yield better crime control outcomes. This defence of failure has generally succeeded because of the taken-for-grantedness of the model. I do not wish to contribute to the continued successful defence of failure. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile exploring what a further strengthening of this approach might entail. We may imagine the model in its most robust state and consider its fit with democratic values and the likely crime control outcomes in the Jamaican setting. This is essentially an exercise in imagining its limits and considering its continued costs to the society.

The best way to strengthen the crime control model would be to solve or resolve the major problems associated with its ineffectiveness. These are: the non-cooperation of the people with the police; resorting to illegal means that compromise the authority and legitimacy of the system; and corruption leading to ineffectiveness and incapacity.

The first, the non-cooperation of the people, would require a dramatic shift in the security environment in order to resolve (not solve) this problem on the terms of the model (for example, a crime that outrages the entire society). In the absence of such a change in the environment, this problem cannot be solved within the model. The second problem, the use of illegal means, is internal to the crime-fighting variant of the crime control model and would require a shift to a more conventional crime control model with greater regard for due

process. The third, corruption on a scale that makes the system ineffective in fulfilling its mission, nullifies any effort to improve the fourth (capacity) and requires greater internal and external accountability. Within the model, this would have to be a selective accountability that is fixed on corruption while ignoring other breaches of the law in dealing with criminal suspects. This is a difficult proposition. Thus, the project of strengthening the model will tend to involve leaving the fundamental problems unresolved and instead, trying to limit the negative fallout of any such strengthening; that is, ensuring that "strengthening" the model does not magnify and make even more apparent its fundamental weaknesses (increased numbers and increased powers leading to increased abuses of power and loss of moral authority) and further compromise effectiveness. And yet this has been its history.

Consistent with the historical pattern, the first aspect of strengthening that is typically demanded is increased police powers. The police already have enormous powers. They have considerable power in law and, in practice, their powers are not limited by the law. What they do not have is the legal authority to detain suspects for long periods. They also face constraints in the courts such as jury trials (with the exception of the Gun Court). Increased police powers without greater accountability is likely to lead to more abuse and alienation which, in turn, would fertilize self-help justice and deepen the subculture of violence.

There are, however, constant demands from the public and within the legislature for harsher punishments. It should be remembered that there was a time (less than 200 years ago) when we had capital punishment for rape, the theft of livestock, practicing *obya* (or obeah) and many other crimes. This was preserved until 1841 when capital punishment for theft was abolished. As Jonathan Dalby informs us in his book *Crime and Punishment in Jamaica 1756–1856*, the last person to be put to

death by the state for this kind of offence was Thomas Gordon for stealing an ox worth 10 pounds. (Since then, as the people became more propertied, they continued to kill cow thieves as self-help justice.) The penultimate victim of this kind of justice was Simon Fisher who was sentenced to death for stealing half gallon of rum valued at 5 shillings.[64] None of this has worked, either as a system of crime control or as a system of domination. Despite what must have been a measure of public support for these punishments, especially among the propertied groups, it simply discredited the system and dissociated it from any reasonable notion of justice. In the current situation it is believed that there is some symbolic value in harsher punishments – but we should have learnt some lessons from the Gun Court and other such recent attempts.

More severe punishments, as discussed earlier, may result in a virulent criminality.[65]

Capacity and the resource issues

As the crime control model relies primarily on the criminal justice system and on the logic of deterrence, improving the capacity of the system would be expected to increase the risks to the offender which should translate into reduced crime rates. Some obvious measures of capacity include increased numbers and improved technology and mobility.

The police force is the primary instrument that is available to the state for manipulating the risk to the offender. Jamaica has a low police density relative to the other Caribbean countries. In 2007, its ratio of police to citizens was 1:277 while the mean for the countries listed in Table 3 was 1:216. (See Table 3). It is therefore suggested that Jamaica should increase the size of its police force. Evidence from within the Caribbean, however, hardly suggests that there is an inverse relationship between police density and crime rates. St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines all have very high

police densities and very high homicide rates. Grenada also has a high police density and one of the highest aggregate crime rates in the region. On the other hand, several countries such as Barbados, Guyana and Antigua which have lower police densities also have relatively lower rates of serious crime. Moreover, in Europe, lower police densities (relative to the USA) coexist with lower rates of violent crime and lower aggregate crime rates (relative to the USA).[66]

Within the region, the case of Trinidad and Tobago is particularly instructive. In recent years that country has invested heavily in its police service and has significantly increased the strength of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Between 1990 and 2007, there was a 61.7 per cent increase in the number of full-time police officers.[67] Yet, during this period the homicide rate increased 4.3 times from 6.9 incidents per 100,000 citizens to 29.7 incidents per 100,000 citizens. Mobility may be regarded as a multiplier of numerical strength. A large fleet of new vehicles was recently secured to ensure the full mobility of the TTPS. The high police density and mobility seem not to have had an impact on the rates of serious crime (in 2008, the homicide rate increased to 42.2/100,000). Analyses of the impact of police density in the Jamaican context suggest that while there may be some short-term control effects there are no such long-term effects.[68]

More important than numbers are policing systems. If the size of a bad system is increased, it will still be a bad system. It may even become a worse and more discredited system. Recent local experience would also seem to urge caution. The Grants Pen Community Policing pilot project (2002–2007) provided the local police unit with near perfect working conditions and the area with an extraordinarily high police density of one police officer for every 116 citizens. During the period of the project, that is, in the short term, the murder rates fell but this was true for the country as a whole and for many high-violence

communities that did not enjoy any change in the numerical strength of their local police units. And even with the high police density in a small area, the rates of some categories of serious crime increased during the period.[69] Given what was previously known about the effects of variation in police strength, these results should not have been surprising.[70] On the other hand, in some contexts, increasing the numbers in an improved system may have some pay-offs (especially if the increases are in units that perform critical policing functions) but even then one should be cautious about this. Increased police strength is not a sufficient condition for improved effectiveness.

Table 3.   Police Density – Selected Caribbean Countries (2007)

Country	Strength	Population	Ratio
St. Kitts and Nevis	400	39,200	1:98
Grenada	867	105,000	1:121
Trinidad and Tobago	8,300	1,300,000	1:157
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	850	118,000	1:139
Barbados	1,427	278,000	1:194
St. Lucia	826	168,000	1:203
Antigua and Barbuda	329	83,000	1:252
Guyana	2,900	750,000	1:259
Jamaica	9,671	2,675,800	1.277
Total	**25,570**	**5,517,000**	**1:216**

Note:
(a)   Rural police are not included.
(b)   Special police units and forces that are regularly involved in law enforcement are included in the computations for all countries.
(c)   For much of the information on the auxiliary and special police units, I have had to rely on personal communication with police officials rather than official documentation.

Technology and scientific applications enhance capacity. Technology may be seen as a human resource multiplier, as means of improving efficiency and as problem-solving devices that contribute to improving effectiveness. Forensic applications

are often presented as solutions to the problem of low arrest and conviction rates that are due to reluctant witnesses. Since 1994, considerable effort has been made to improve the use of these techniques in police investigations. Much training has been done and equipment acquired. But arrest and conviction rates for some of the most serious crimes have continued to decline. In 1994, the arrest rate for murder was 44 per cent and in 2007 it had declined to 34 per cent.[71] In 2007, the conviction rate, as noted earlier, declined to less than 10 per cent. An increase in the number of investigators trained is associated with lower arrest and conviction rates. This should not be surprising. Given the emergence of a subculture of violence and "all things being equal", the declining arrest and conviction rates are theoretically expected outcomes.

Consistent with the logic of the model, it could be argued that not enough was done. A case may always be made for more and better technology. But technology has its limits. It is a poor response to the sociopolitical problem of alienation of the people and the administrative problem of bad internal systems and methods of work. Trinidad and Tobago is a case in point. There has been considerable expenditure (well beyond the means of Jamaica) on many information gathering gadgets/surveillance equipment and forensics support systems. The best possible investigative training was given to a large number of police specialists.[72] Yet, like Jamaica, their conviction rate for murder has continued to fall. In 2006 it was 6 per cent.[73] Equipment acquired at great cost was underutilized and not properly maintained.[74]

The experiences of the wealthy countries suggest that high police density and the application of advanced technologies to policing are not sufficient to make policing effective. The history of policing suggests that the relationship of the police to the people served (including all sub-populations) is primary. While technology may be useful, it is not a substitute for this.

If the application of science and technology is viewed as one means of compensating for the chasm between the people and the police, the use of cash incentives for information is another. This is now done via the Crime Stop programme. With some imagination, the use of these means could be extended at little additional cost to the state and private donors. Cash incentives are expected to have the effect of increasing the risk of doing illegal business. This is consistent with the logic of the model. Presently, the primary target is guns. In the Jamaican context, the intent is clearly to remove the means of violence but targetting guns does not necessarily direct the effort at disrupting the systems for importing the guns and the activities of the high-end criminals who have the ability to deliver large-scale violence and to wage "wars". Targetting these elements would require much greater cash incentives to encourage members of crime groups to assist with the conviction of other members and leaders and to terminate their crime careers. The magnitude of the funds to be paid to the informant matters. Rewarding the informant with a significant proportion of the assets of the leaders of the organized crime groups would satisfy this requirement. Rewards that exceed $20 million for each conviction (a small proportion of the wealth of the more successful criminals) would excite some interest.

This kind of incentive would have to be accompanied by measures to safeguard against abuses. The history of criminal justice offers many cautionary notes about possible abuses and perverse outcomes when these kinds of incentive are given in order to improve crime control. Earlier attempts to reward informants with the property of criminal suspects led to the manufacture of crimes by informants who were, themselves, criminals.[75] The targets of such a measure would have to be restricted to a list of known suspects on whom sufficient evidence had already been acquired to justify an arrest, and the police excluded as beneficiaries. There are other problems.

Paying for what should be a civic duty to report undermines notions of civic responsibility. This kind of measure admits to the multiple weaknesses of the state system. If successful, however, cash incentives may be used to move from a position of weakness to a position of strength.

There is, perhaps, some scope for greater effectiveness within the model but this is rather limited. The crime situation warrants a different approach. One such alternative is the social justice model.

The Social Justice Model

The social justice model associates criminality and crime with unjust social arrangements and systems. Crime may be prevented and even "solved" by socioeconomic change. Crime prevention and control thus involves attending to the "root" or primary causes and reordering society. Generally, the taproot of crime is seen as social injustice. Its corrective, social justice, involves arrangements that produce similar opportunities and life chances for all including respect for their rights. This is expected to improve the life chances of the poor and the rates of social mobility. The intended outcome is a shift from ascriptive to achievement hierarchies, greater social integration and social cohesion, the promotion and acceptance of a set of values and values hierarchy that elevate equality and thus mutual respect, and thereby lower crime rates.

Within this model, injustice is regarded as being rooted not just in the distribution of social goods and the inequalities and social disadvantage that is associated with this, but also as having its roots in the power relations in society.[76] Injustice may therefore be expressed in terms of over-control. The laws themselves are viewed as repressive instruments of the powerful and as a source of injustice. For justice to be expressed as laws therefore requires a shift in the power relations.

These structural explanations of crime point to social and institutional change as central to crime prevention and control.

Unlike the crime control model which, consistent with its name, seeks to manage and control crime, here the focus is on crime prevention, that is, on reducing criminality. In its more radical forms this model may have as its goal "solving" the crime problem via a radical re-ordering of society. Restricted to its more modest objective of simply preventing crime, reforms that invariably involve increasing the opportunities for the poor and reducing poverty are usually advocated. An example of this is the proposal by a former Public Defender, Howard Hamilton, for a kind of "Marshall Plan" for the Kingston inner-city communities.[77] These types of measures are accompanied by attention to greater fairness and reducing class bias in the criminal justice system. Generally the two major planks are social interventionism and reengineering the criminal justice system. The justification for reengineering the criminal justice system is not just to make it more effective in controlling crime (this is sufficient justification on the crime control model) but also, as a matter of justice, of treating people fairly and equally (in terms of access to security and according criminal suspects due process rights). The goal of reform is to get the criminal justice system to give expression to the values and principles associated with social justice in its everyday institutional practices. The idea is that this will result in greater authority, legitimacy and cooperation of the public and, in turn, more effective crime control. The transformation of the criminal justice system is thus treated as an important element of crime prevention. Justice trumps crime control outcomes.

Jamaica may be said to have experienced aspects of this model in the 1970s. In 1974, the then political administration led by Michael Manley declared democratic socialism and opted for a programme with the stated objective of achieving greater social justice.[78] Equality was promoted as a cardinal political value and programmes were implemented in education, housing and agriculture that created greater equality of opportunity across gender, area (urban and rural) and class groupings. There was

much greater access to education at all levels and even tuition fees at the tertiary level were abolished and students given considerable assistance with housing and other allowances. The National Housing Trust created new opportunities for home ownership and has been highly successful. There was an extensive land reform programme. The outcome of these programmes included increased rates of social mobility and a better-integrated society. These policies, however, led to increased expectations that were not met. By the mid-1970s the country went into a deep economic crisis.[79] These policies and programmes of the Manley administration may not have been successful and have been subjected to much critical assessment but their goals have not been seriously contested.

In the sphere of national security, crime control and prevention there were many elements of continuity with the crime control model. As was already noted, this was the period when the Gun Court was erected and the Green Bay "massacre" organized. The policies of this period, however, most closely approximate the social justice model although they may not closely fit the ideal. The social justice model, like the others, are ideal types. They were never implemented in their pure forms nor imagined by policy makers as such.

Legislation was used as an instrument of reform. Examples of this include the Criminal Justice Reform Act (1978), which increased the sentencing options available to judges, and the Parole Act (1978) which introduced parole in Jamaica over 130 years after the English experimented with the "mark system" or an early form of parole in the penal colony of Norfolk Island, and over 100 years after it was introduced as law in New York, USA.[80]

These laws brought change to the back end of the criminal justice system. Direct social justice reform was largely focussed on the prisons. Rehabilitation programmes were given new life. Literacy programmes that were being implemented in the

society were extended to the prisons. Work programmes aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production were introduced in the prisons as programmes for prison self-sufficiency. Much of this was also taking place in Guyana under the ideological influence of cooperative socialism and may still be found there. But at the front end was very traditional crime fighting. Internal consistency was lacking.

Despite the efforts, the social justice reforms of the 1970s floundered and an outcome was higher rates of violent crime. According to Carl Stone, the higher rates in the 1980s may be attributed in part to:

> a social ideology emerging in the 1970s which viewed the poor and the oppressed as victims and encouraged class resentment against the rich, thereby justifying crimes against the affluent as just vindication of social oppression.[81]

Stone attributed this outcome to the approach itself; not its failure. This is quite debatable, but time and space do not permit a further exploration of this issue.

Many of the old problems of social injustice remain but important changes have also occurred. The marginalization of large sections of the urban poor, urban–rural inequalities, income inequalities, high rates of unemployment and disregard for the rights of poor citizens are all contemporary problems. "We want justice!" is still a powerful slogan in Jamaica. On the other hand, there is also greater equality of opportunity and, importantly, the character of the crime problem has also changed.

The big challenge for this model in the present context would be to demonstrate its relevance and power for dealing with the contemporary challenges of organized crime and the subculture of violence. In this regard, it must be understood that the "roots" of the problem are not just social marginalization and lack of legitimate opportunities (which the social justice model responds

to) but the existence of an elaborate illegitimate opportunity structure and the emergence of a subculture of violence. The latter means that even if the socioeconomic problems are addressed, high rates of violence are likely to continue for some time. Attending to the root socioeconomic causes is unlikely to yield much short- to medium-term effects on the homicide rate. Law enforcement has become more important. The model is not incompatible with this but the sequencing of programmes and resource allocations would have to be carefully considered.

In order to have a long-term impact on organized crime and the subculture of violence, pathways of opportunity to the mainstream must be constructed. This may have the effect of undermining the illegal opportunity structure and should promote greater social cohesion.

Weaknesses of the Model

This model has its weaknesses. It may be used to approach the problems in a targetted manner that is grounded in empirical analyses of the specific primary causes of specific crimes. Alternatively, it may proceed as a more diffused grand transformational design for the society that simply regards crime reduction as an outcome of a process of socioeconomic transformation and a justification for this transformation project.

In a restricted variant, the crime problem may be treated as part of a more modest reformist but still diffused effort that tackles poverty, poor housing and other social problems. In some conditions these projects, for example, inner-city projects aimed at improving housing conditions, may have the opposite effect of entrenching the crime networks that already dominate these communities. The crime dons may receive contracts from state agencies to provide security and construction services and/or they may carry out extortion on the construction sites and thereby strengthen their hold on power in the communities

that are targetted for these improvements. Social justice reforms may be directed at reducing poverty but fail to alter the relationships and conditions that are specific to the crime problem. The model is likely to fail if it expects crime reduction to be an automatic outcome of doing good and doing justice. In the present conditions, it is likely to fail if it neglects law enforcement.

An Integrated Model

The above models are partial and vary in emphases. The crime control model focusses on policing solutions; the social justice model emphasizes social crime prevention and societal transformation. This diatonic structuring of the policy choices finds expression in the official and popular debates (it is not clear which is echoing which) as the appropriateness of "social interventions" versus "tough" police action. The posing of the options in this way indicates an ideological polarization or attempt to ideologize and thus politically polarize crime prevention and control.

The polarizing narratives are ways of claiming and contesting power. Advocating "get tough" crime fighting and accusing those who are critical of such an approach as being soft on crime is one way of making a power claim. Blocking law enforcement measures and emphasizing "social interventions" may be ways of expressing or even exploiting the distrust of the political administration and the police, that is, distrust of their use of power for crime control and national security. Opposition and governing parties alternate in taking these two positions in an effort to politically outmanoeuvre each other. Power is too often used primarily to further partisan rather than national goals. This is why achieving political and social consensus on crime prevention and control policy is so difficult. Jamaica has a system that cannot achieve common purpose to respond to an extraordinary crime problem even when crime control is identified as the most important social problem

facing the country. This is a dysfunctional politics that makes the governance of crime control ineffective.[82] One consequence of this is *sub rosa* crime fighting.

Any crime control strategy must therefore be regarded as a political process, as having an explicit political dimension that must be deliberately pursued. This political dimension involves building trust among the different political and institutional actors and between these actors and the publics as a path to consensus. Trust cannot be built passively. It must be built via the exercise of power in crime control. This is where trustworthiness must be demonstrated. It means acting effectively, in a manner that is consistent with democratic values and with accountability to the law and the public. It means exhibiting reliability (predictability), impartiality, discrimination (targetting), and consistency between words and deeds.

The integrated model tries to transcend the crime control and social justice models and law enforcement versus social crime prevention polarities, and to integrate the categories of causes (root cause, proximate causes and facilitators such as corruption; that is, roots, branches and leaves), the different levels or units at which action should be directed (national and community – later work may add family and individual), and to proffer a synthesis – admittedly one that is still not sufficiently systematized.

If the social justice model is focussed on national socioeconomic transformation, the integrated model is primarily aimed at control and prevention at the level of the high-violence communities and communities at risk. Consistent with the pattern of spatial concentration of violent crime, the rather more modest goal is to alter the social environment at the community level. It is profoundly preventative and transformational but not as a grand national transformation. It is transformation that is sufficient for crime prevention and control results.

Transformation is the means, not the goal as in the social justice model. The goal is crime reduction or, more specifically, the reduction of violent crime.

> However, in order to succeed locally there must be some control over those larger forces that created and continue to sustain the conditions in the communities that are associated with their exclusion/marginalization. Illegal opportunity structures associated with organized crime have developed in these conditions. The subculture of violence is sustained by these conditions. Some national changes are therefore required. Altering the social environment at the community level entails better integrating these communities which means transforming their experiences with the national institutions of the state and society. And transforming their experiences with these institutions involves transforming the institutions.

Community action does not take place in a cocoon; it is best pursued as an element of a larger change process but a manageable one because the locus of action is in the community. For example, transforming how policing is delivered in these communities may contribute to change in the police force nationally. Transformation thus occurs at both community and national level but it is the violence reduction needs at the local level that drive national institutional reform in justice, police and other state agencies.

This model, like the others, must tackle the three major problems; that is, organized crime, the subculture of violence and tolerance of violence. The high-violence communities of Kingston, Spanish Town and to a lesser extent Montego Bay are the loci of all three.

Pacification of the high-violence communities

The first challenge in dealing with the high-violence communities is to pacify them, to impose a cessation of violence. I have deliberately used the word imposition because if the characterization of the problem as a system of violence and a subculture of violence is correct then pacification has to be an imposition by the state. In these communities, negotiated agreements are able to bring only temporary peace and may serve to acknowledge and reinforce the power of the criminal groups.[83] In order to reclaim the communities the state must re-assert itself in new self-transforming ways, leading with law enforcement.

Pacification involves bringing the rule of law to the high-violence communities and ending the pattern of "wars", revenge killings, and "community" justice. It therefore means confronting the power of the organized crime groups that dominate many of these communities and influence their social organization and political administration. Pacification, if it is to be lasting, must involve shifting the power relationships in the communities. It must begin with physically removing the most violent actors and doing so in a manner that disrupts the organizations and systems including the web of relationships that generate material benefits from violence and sustain organized crime and other violent groups in these communities.

This first step in pacification, if a direct approach is taken, would involve the arrest of a large number of the violent entrepreneurs. It would exclude the thousands of individuals who are annually caught up in conflict violence, that is, not-for-profit violence. This leaves much of the violence unattended but has the advantage of being more targeted. Such a tight focus on organized crime but nevertheless involving the detention

of large numbers of persons is similar to the Mafia round-up in Italy in the 1980s which seriously weakened the power of the Mafia in that country. In response to its recrudescence, a second round of arrests took place in December 2008, 20-odd years after the first set of mass arrests. Some 92 mafia suspects were picked up in Italy in early December 2008, which was considerably less than the 500 suspects who were arrested and put on trial in the 1980s. Mass arrests were similarly used in an attempt to pacify the gangs in urban Haiti. Some 700 persons were arrested in Haiti, which brought some temporary relief. However, without proper investigations many had to be released without trial. Proper preparatory investigative work had not been done. Contrasting institutional capacities (Italy and Haiti), styles of work and environmental conditions may have dictated different approaches. I have given the numbers to show that targetted action, managed actions of these sorts may bring results without causing general harm to society. How this may be best done to ensure effective outcomes while limiting the scope for abuses and the passing of laws that could have a more deleterious long-term impact on the state of human rights is a matters to be negotiated. But I believe that it is possible to do this. The alternative is a lower risk approach that may not seriously disrupt the activities of the territorially-based groups (which are the most violent groups) and which may allow time for adjustment to the incremental case by case approach of the police.

Mass arrests may help to favourably alter the fundamentals of the crime problem if they are used to signal the beginning of a shift in power from the dons to the more conventional leadership of the communities and the state system (not to be confused with the party system). Delivering reliable and effective policing in the once criminally dominated communities is another aspect that would help to consolidate this shift in power. The socioeconomic aspects, to the extent that they reduce the dependence on illegal

opportunities and open up new, legitimate opportunities for making a living, are yet another.

In order to prevent an early reversal to the *status quo ante* (such as that which occurred in Haiti) convictions of the top leaders of the organized crime groups must be secured and the institutions that facilitate their access to state funds must be brought under greater scrutiny and accountability.[84] Given the power that these persons are able to exercise in the communities, convictions for violent street crimes such as murder have proved to be difficult and are likely to continue to be difficult even after local power shifts have occurred. Tracking, freezing and seizing the criminally acquired money of the leaders of these groups may be a fruitful tactical direction. If this includes their financial contributions to political parties then such investigations may unravel important elements in these networks, strain the relationships with the parties as institutions and perhaps even precipitate efforts by the parties to put distance between themselves and the organized crime groups.

Corruption in law enforcement is a major obstacle to investigations of this type. Corruption prevention and control measures are therefore a condition for any success in law enforcement. In the short term, the risks associated with corruption may be minimized. It is possible for a small unit of very competent financial investigators and prosecutors to succeed in securing conviction and the forfeiture of the assets of the wealthier "dons" and other high-end criminals.[85] This might appear to circumvent the police but it is necessary to look for ways of moving ahead in the short term and not be totally constrained by the problems of the existing institutions and available resources for their transformation.

This is a strategy of targeting organized crime in a manner that starves it of the oxygen it needs in order to survive. Relieving it of its money is one aspect of this strategy that is well known. What is required and what I have tried to suggest is an approach

that is likely to work in Jamaican conditions. The second sustaining element is its relationship to powerful institutional actors particularly in the police force, the political parties and the state bureaucracy (at national and local levels). Corruption control must target these enabling relationships. The third aspect is the support of the communities and specifically the code of silence that gives the powerful criminals immunity from law enforcement. All are sources of the power of the organized crime groups. Money, state contracts, political influence – all facilitate its entrepreneurial character, mask its predatory activity, extend its influence into the national institutions and cement its position in the communities of the urban poor.

Consolidating the pacification of the high violence communities would require a permanent police presence for an extended period of time. The regular police do not seem to have the capacity to maintain an effective permanent presence in these communities for long periods. Their efforts may have to be supported by voluntary avocational policing units. The National Home Guard of the 1970s is an example of this type of organization.

> The policing of high-violence communities is a labour-intensive exercise. Voluntary avocational policing is a low-cost solution that has the advantage of connecting the community to the state security institutions.

There are, however, risks involved with the use of avocational policing. As was noted earlier in the text, there were several problems with the National Home Guard in the 1970s. These included politicization, the incorporation of criminal elements and the use of power to settle personal scores. Minimization of these problems would require both police supervision and independent civilian oversight.

Police reform

It may be possible to successfully execute the early stages of any crime control strategy without the successful reform of the police and larger security sector and criminal justice system. The general project, however, requires police (and justice sector) reform. Much has already been written about this.[86] Police reform is an ambitious task that has already taken more than 15 years to get to this point and it is likely to take many more before there is any clear evidence of successful crime control outcomes. A useful tactic may be to transform the police in parts – by taking and transforming one or two critical functions at a time. For policing in our context, the critical functions are investigation, intelligence gathering and analysis and operations (there are also important public order-related functions). There are clear structures associated with these functions. Given that organized crime is the primary first stage target, the focus of first stage police reform should be the transformation of investigations. This is a sure way of testing the strength of the system as a strong system is one that is able to successfully investigate and contribute to the conviction of powerful criminals. Towards this end, I wish to propose that a separate investigative agency be formed. This would permit a separate recruiting strategy from that of the JCF, a different salary scale that would widen the pool of potential recruits, and the development of a more professional culture. This new organization could be built around Kingfish, thereby permitting a measured continuity and transfer of skills and the best personnel from the old system. More generally, this more focussed strategy of reform would fix police reform to the outcomes that are required at each stage of the larger crime control strategy which, at the first stage, would include being able to get convictions of the key figures in the organized crime networks. There is symmetry but my thinking is organized around recognizing the adjustments that are required in order to get the desired outcomes.

The above proposal may be regarded as advocacy of parallel policing structures (Earlier I made a similar proposal regarding financial investigation and will later advocate new structures in the justice sector also.). The setting up of parallel structures has been a way of avoiding reform. This is not my intent. Rather, this proposal is based on recognition of the ineffectiveness of the existing state system, the low levels of confidence in aspects of this system as well as an appreciation of the difficulty in changing these structures. It is therefore a more measured approach to reform that is calibrated according to the needs of each stage of the crime control strategy. It involves measures that are likely to succeed and in the process gain capacity, the confidence of the public and strength. This approach, I think, allows for quicker law enforcement gains that may galvanize wider and deeper change.

Measuring success

If successful, this phase of the crime control strategy would:

- Remove the visibly successful models of violent criminality
- Weaken the garrisons and the power of criminal groups over the urban communities
- Put some strain on the crime–politics relationships
- Weaken the corrupt, criminally exploitable relationships that extend from the communities to the state agencies via the political parties. If it involves structural changes (accountability, transparency), then an element of prevention would be added thereby making it more difficult for organized crime networks to exploit the resources of the state
- Generate greater confidence in the ability of the state to control crime
- Prevent some economic and political risks

Given my analysis of the character of the crime problem, the measures of success for phases 1 and 2 cannot be simply a reduction in the homicide rate and the rates of other major crimes. These may occur without any change in the fundamentals. Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, such reductions in the crime rates may result from the increased power of organized crime groups. The above indicators provide better measures of the state of public safety and the progress with crime control. They may help us to know when we have brought violent crime under control and achieved sustainable outcomes.

In the first phase of the crime prevention and control strategy, the focus is on law enforcement. The existing power relationships in the high-violence communities do not allow social crime prevention interventions to be successful. The dons act as gatekeepers and may exploit large projects and use them to reinforce their power. The inner-city housing projects, for example, have improved the housing conditions of many but they were exploited by the gangsters. Breaking the hold of these groups on the communities and improving law enforcement are conditions for the success of other programmes and for better integrating these communities.

Integrating the communities of the urban poor

The second phase of the strategy would involve greater effort to transform the social and physical environment in the high-violence communities. Transformation may be engineered by the state but will not occur as a gift of the state (on the basis of patronage relationships and the political methodology that caused the problems in the first place). A first step to transformation is greater integration of these communities. Integration means creating better opportunities for the marginalized and greater respect for their rights as citizens. A condition for this is a new relationship with the state agencies,

especially with law enforcement. That, I think, will require greater citizen participation and new systems of direct accountability to the communities. If successful, the outcome should be greater social cohesion and an erosion of the subculture of violence. Involve key institutions: education, training and work/employment, and the justice system.

Greater equality of opportunity may be created via access to education (not simply school enrollment). Some time ago I did a survey of two Kingston inner-city communities that included some measurement of their attitudes to education. I was interested in this because a positive attitude towards education and a willingness to invest in it may be taken as indicators that the personal advancement of self and children is possible and, beyond this, as a commitment to improvement by a slow conventional process. The context of the study was the strong sense among many young people of a blockage to opportunities by area stigma, and the fallout of males from the education system. I found that despite these realities, education was still highly valued, not so much as a means of personal transformation and growth but as a means to a better life. Its value was regarded as being primarily instrumental. Educational access therefore tends to excite expectations. If these expectations are not met, moreso if there is anticipation that they will not be met, increased dropping out of the system must be expected and a turn to crime as an alternate means of realizing one's life goals.

From the narrow perspective of crime prevention, dealing with anticipated failure and the idea that educational effort and preparation for a conventional career is pointless is perhaps the biggest challenge. Anticipated failure is grounded in the experience of marginalization and perhaps the exaggeration of this experience (exaggerated because it ignores the rates of mobility). The pathways to opportunity and the mainstream of society must be made clearer and the communities must be attractive enough to retain people who have taken these pathways. They then become models and sources of information.

Social success is based on educational achievement, not simply access to schooling. Poor schools may be dead-ends rather than pathways. The empirical research is clear enough on this.[87] We were initially confounded by the results regarding the relationship between educational access and crime. It was expected that increased access would reduce criminality. The results suggested the opposite. We then realized that we had to assess the impact of educational access (measured as percentage enrolled) quite separately from that of educational achievement (measured even simply as the number of years in school, but preferably by performance in the CXC). Educational achievement tends to strengthen conventional attachments and reduce criminality.[88]

The difficulty is when the education system does not prepare young people to become good citizens and for success in the world of work and when the relationship between diligence, competence and success is not learnt from the school experience. An effort must be made to improve the quality of education in the schools that serve the high-violence communities. There are a number of conditions that are necessary for this to occur, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this lecture and my competence. However, one of these is to improve the learning environment by reducing violence in the schools. There are a few programmes that have scored some success in doing this such as Change From Within.[89] These programmes have earned the support of the public and should be strengthened from public funds. The country also needs a better structured and easily accessible second chance system, perhaps built around the community colleges. This is an expensive and demanding "project".

Work and improvement of the socioeconomic conditions

The pathway is incomplete if education is not connected to work opportunities. This connection may be done in different ways with different outcomes. Prior to the opening up of the education system and mass education, the few who were able to advance to

the secondary and tertiary levels were able to find careers that gave them a middle-class lifestyle. With mass education, there is greater equality of opportunity but a danger that the inner-city schools may simply replicate the marginalization of the urban poor with their unprepared graduates employed as low-level service workers. There is the danger that the school system may not truly integrate unless the schools deliver quality education.

The alternative is to truly transform the lives of individuals and communities by widening the routes to the professions, higher-level skills and preparedness for self-employment and business and importantly, to open up second chance routes to these and other careers via institutions such as HEART. Integration improves the life chances of individuals and leads to transformation of their lives and those of their families. The challenge of community transformation would, however, still remain. To achieve the latter, it must be more directly linked to individual advancement.

The problem of the inner-city communities (particularly those in Kingston) is that social mobility leads to outward geographic mobility. This is the delinking of individual success and community success. The communities remain blighted. The challenge is to couple individual transformation to community transformation by having the successful individuals remain in the communities, invest in their homes (the homes of their parents), help to advance the key institutions (schools), and be models of conventional success for other young people. Community transformation rests on their integration and social mobility without residential mobility. To achieve this, some necessary conditions (perhaps not sufficient) include reducing public poverty (better schools, better roads and garbage collection services), improving community safety and increasing community efficacy.

This is a heavy demand on the resources of the state. If, however, it were to succeed in breaking the existing patterns and changing the crime patterns and social organization of these communities, then it would be worth it.

The above changes and processes of change, particularly in law enforcement, would create better conditions for more direct social crime prevention projects in the communities. There are many such projects that are now operative and which are being delivered by various state and non-state actors including the churches, the Grace and Staff Foundation, the Kingston Restoration Company, the Peace Management Initiative, the Violence Prevention Alliance, and the Citizens Security and Justice Programme (CSJP). The different types of activities range beyond social crime prevention and include moral instruction and remedial education, sports as diversion, peace-making and conflict resolution. The Grace and Staff Foundation, for example, awarded 358 scholarships to students from the inner-city community of Southside who are enrolled at secondary and tertiary educational institutions.[90] The Kingston Restoration Company operates a well-appointed Homework Centre in the same community.

Some of these projects are now being evaluated. There appears to have been some successes, but as crime prevention, these successes have not been lasting. I would not be surprised if their crime prevention impact is very limited. These projects are perhaps not perfectly designed and executed (for crime prevention) but even if they were, they would nevertheless reveal the limits of the local – especially in a bad national environment with a stagnant to declining economy). As useful as these projects may be, their national impact will be limited if the economy remains stagnant to declining and new opportunities are not created on a larger scale. Growth from incremental increases of the existing sectors of the economy is unlikely to satisfy the demand for jobs and improved living standards. As

so many competent economists have concluded, new sectors of the economy will have to be created.[91] A transformation of economy, of political methods and of institutional behaviour, seems to be required. Transformation of the institutions that are responsible for the prevention and control of crime, however, seem most urgent. Institutional change should broaden the range of tools available to these institutions for dealing with the problem of violence and conflict management in particular.

Conflict management

The subculture of violence would still remain after the pacification of the high violence communities and the breaking of the hold of the organized crime networks and gangs on the communities. If this problem is not solved high levels of violence, particularly conflict violence, would remain even after the institutionalization of the norms of the subculture which would have the effect of reducing it and after much of the predatory violence (which is the most fear-inducing form) would have been arrested. If high-levels of violence remain, then the demand for the informal community courts would also remain.

The high-violence communities would need an alternate, state-integrated form of dispute resolution that is well regulated and that, unlike jungle justice, is not based on the whim of powerful individuals. Such a structure must be locally accessible, sensitive and cheap, and must have the moral and legal authority to deal with conflict of all types. It should be viewed as a preventive mechanism that avoids violent self-help "justice".

The Dispute Resolution Foundation, I believe, has this mission. It should be strengthened as an extension of the state's justice system that offers a wider range of effective and participatory low-cost solutions. This would have the effect of weakening the justification for self-help violence and thereby undermine the subculture of violence. The forms of institutionalization are of considerable importance in

determining the effectiveness of these measures. There could be some experimentation with panels of Justices of the Peace that are locally composed and which form accountable parts of the justice system. These should be empowered to try to settle all types of dispute using principles that are authoritative. Some bold innovations are required here.

Limitations
The thrust of my argument and proposals is based on the idea that the achievement of the short-term violence control goals is best based on the linking of informal and formal power, the power of the state and that of the people, legal and moral authority. But I have tended to emphasize the role of the state in this partnership and limited somewhat the role of the institutions of informal social control. There are reasons for this.

The role of the people is compounded by the subculture of violence. In a regular situation where there is no subculture of violence, community and family as small social units are expected to impose some control on criminality. They will tend to make their members more resilient to criminality, and they impose negative sanctions when violations occur. The offender loses standing in the unit. As social beings, this matters. That is why informal control tends to be effective. Hence the conventional wisdom that crime prevention ought to target families and through them, teach "proper values and attitudes".

However, in a subculture of violence and an environment that is tolerant of some categories of crime, the family unit may be supportive of these forms of violence. Social organization may reinforce some forms of violence. Domestic violence and child beating are obvious examples of this. The subculture of violence, however, takes approval of violence well beyond this. One may lose standing as a brother, father or husband if family members are offended or physically harmed and revenge is not taken. I have encountered cases of this type among death row prisoners.

This development has implications for how informal control is handled and how the state is coupled with it. Where the subculture is not dominant it is relatively easy to design the linkages to the state system. Where there is institutionalization of the subculture, crime control is, at least initially, a top-down, state-controlled project. The garrison communities are a special case. If social organization may reinforce the use of violence, political organization plays a similar role in the garrison communities. This is why they present special challenges.[92]

The above demonstrates the difficulty of the situation and the challenges of crafting appropriate strategies. I hope it will serve to alert us to how little we still know, the dynamic nature of the crime environment, why we must be careful and thoughtful about what we do and remain open to new evidence and to adjustments in policy.

The financing limitation

Crime prevention and control have to be financed. There are considerable constraints on this. Jamaica has a huge debt burden. In 2007, its debt to GDP ratio was 126.06 (2007).[93] Much of this debt has accumulated as a result of many years of borrowing to support the budget. Financing of crime prevention and control must, in addition, occur in the context of a serious global financial and economic crisis that will have implications for the crime problem itself. The crisis presents two problems: (a) the likelihood of increased rates of predatory crime and (b) greater difficulty in funding crime prevention and control. In this context, crime prevention is likely to be funded if loans and grants are available. Jamaica seems to be trapped in a vicious cycle: the economy must grow in order to be able to better finance crime prevention, and we need crime prevention in order to grow.[94]

The solution is to be modest in the development of crime prevention and control plans and innovative in finding low-

cost solutions and using loan funds effectively. A grand design that requires large sums will not get off the ground. The social problems that nurture violent crime are likely to remain for a long time. The short- to medium-term goal is simply to reduce the violence and power of the criminal groups.

Judging the success or failure of the model

The success of the integrated model, like that of the other two models that have been discussed, may be judged by the extent to which it achieves real control and reduction of violent crime and achieves the pacification of the high-violence communities. In achieving these outcomes it must alter the very character of the problem by repressing and preventing entrepreneurial crimes that profit from violence and by expunging criminal groups from the local and national power circuits.

The first outcome (violence reduction) may be measured by the volume of reported crimes and victimization surveys. The objective is not just to reduce the rates of reported crimes but to make the society safer and, with the emergence of the territorially-based organized crime groups, the former is no longer a reliable indicator of the latter. Reported and even true crime rates therefore cannot be the only measures of success because they may be deceptive. Lower rates may be the result of consolidated crime systems whereby the more powerful organized crime groups develop local monopolies and exert effective control over petty criminals that operate in their territories. The institutionalization of the subculture of violence may also have the effect of reducing the rate of conflict crimes. We should therefore keep one eye on the changes in the crime rates and the other on measures of the fundamentals of the problem.

As has been repeatedly noted, altering the fundamentals means breaking the domination of the communities by the organized crime groups and gangs by cutting their relationships

to the political process and other power circuits, their relationships with the communities and with the police. It means being able to convict powerful offenders be they leaders of organized crime, business leaders or parliamentarians. These things are all measurable outcomes. Altering the fundamentals also means integrating the communities of the urban poor and lowering youth unemployment rates, breaking the code of silence in the communities and improving the levels of confidence in law enforcement. The model would be considered successful if the responsible state institutions were to become more responsive to the security needs of the citizens and respectful of their rights. The integrated model will not alter all of these fundamentals in the first or second phases but should begin to register changes in the crime-related indicators.

V
CONCLUSION

I have focussed the discussion on strategies and models of crime control. It is important to try to get this right. But there are other more difficult problems that will have to be solved. The intellectual challenges are perhaps the least difficult of all. It would be naive to think that what is needed is simply better ideas about what should be done. There is no guarantee that rational ideas will have broad appeal or appeal among policy makers. The real challenge is getting agreement across the social and political divide and getting effective implementation of an appropriate strategy, doing all the things in between policy, model and strategy and getting the results. These are the difficult political leadership and management challenges – of building trust and confidence and on this basis building coalitions for change, of developing institutional capacity and effectiveness. Given the difficulties of getting things done, we must begin to seek new ways of organizing for results and perhaps create new and better structures.

Crime prevention and control is a continuous process. But we must begin to act now with a greater sense of urgency. As the former American President, George W. Bush, famously said:

> … the storm clouds on the horizon were getting nearly directly overhead.

They are indeed overhead and we must work to ensure that they pass. The required unity of purpose, sense of responsibility, ingenuity and diligence are not beyond us.

Notes

1   This report does not have the status of a policy document but it has been very influential.

2   Behaviour is not always consistent with these policy documents.

3   See Harriott 2002a; 2008b.

4   Cited in C. Beccaria, *An Essay on Crimes and Punishments* (1764; Boston: International Pocket Library, 1983).

5   See Harriott 2002a; 2008a; 2008b.

6   Personal correspondence with Mrs. Evadne McLean, Librarian at the Main Library, UWI Mona Campus, January 2009.

7   At the time of writing, this Task Force had not completed its work but I was effectively no longer a member of it.

8   See *Hansard* Session 1972–1973, Vol. 1, March 21, 1972 to July 27, 1972, Tuesday, July 18, 1972, pp. 222.

9   See J. Wilson, *Thinking about Crime*, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) pp. 46–47.

10   See A. Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2008).

11   See the *Jamaica Observer*, July 17, 2008. I have not confirmed that this was an activity of the established organized crime groups but it may yet reveal the extent of their penetration of the haulage and construction sectors. At least the incident demonstrates the scale on which illegal methods are used in these sectors and the range of actors that are involved to make these methods work.

12   See *Daily Gleaner*, December 15, 2005, p. 1.

13   See Francis et al. 2004. This study estimated that in 2004 approximately 5% of all formal businesses nationally were paying either protection or extortion racketeers (page 22). Impressionistic evidence suggests that these rackets have become more prevalent.

14   For example, of the 1,574 murders that were committed in 2007, it is estimated that fewer than 10% of these resulted in a conviction. Indeed the conviction rate may be as low as 5%. The police claim that most of the unsolved murders are "gang-related" killings.

15   For a more comprehensive discussion of this point see A. Harriott, *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2008) pp. 22–24.

16   The estimate of the number of organized crime groups is mine. The number of gangs was reported in a speech given on December 7, 2008 by the Minister of National Security, Col. Trevor MacMillan, on several national radio stations. For a copy of the text, see the website of the Jamaica Information Service.

17   For a discussion of the character of garrison communities see Chevannes 1992.

18   We now have very good data on assaults from victims who present themselves at the public hospitals.

19   See the *Daily Gleaner*, May 30, 2008. He jumped but did not die. The *Daily Gleaner* report is somewhat sanitized and different from the television account, which allowed viewers to see the behaviour of the crowd. My understanding as expressed above is consistent with what was seen.

20   For a discussion of the significance of this feature see Harriott 2002a.

21   For a more expansive discussion of the emergence of a subculture of violence in Jamaica see A. Harriott, *Bending the Trend Line –The Challenges of Controlling Violent Crime in Jamaica and the High Violence Countries of the Caribbean* (Kingston: Arawak Publishers, 2008).

22   The homicide data was provided by the JCF and the population estimates taken from the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* for the respective years.

23   A national survey conducted by Bill Johnson in January 2007, found that 74% of the respondents regarded crime as "the most pressing problem" facing the country. This was reported in the *Daily Gleaner*, May 21, 2007.

24   See Wortley et al. 2006, p. iv. These findings are supported by data from an on-going study of violence in Jamaica by this author. This positive evaluation of the dons especially applies to their disciplinary activity and control of petty criminals.

25   I estimate that the true murder rate is 5% higher than the reported murder rate. The adjusted arrest rate therefore takes account of this missing 5%.

26   This estimate is based on data provided by state officials. I have not checked the accuracy of these data, but they fit with the pattern from previous years and the theoretical expectations given the emergence of a subculture of violence.

27   See *Project Plan for ICHP 2003*, and *National Housing Trust Notes to the Financial Statements, year ended March 31, 2007*.

28   See *Daily Gleaner*, April 27, 2008.

29   See A. Harriott, 2008a.

30   See Harriott, 2002b. "Experimenting with Avocational Policing: The Case of the National Home Guards of Jamaica," *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology*, Vol. 6 # 1–2, pp. 36–61.

31   An estimate is needed, but any attempt to do that here would be much too crude.

32   See L. Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber, 1954).

33   See Powell 2006, pp. 58.

34   See the *National Security Policy – Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation* (Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 2007).

35   For a discussion of more recent approaches see UNODC/World Bank 2007.

36   See J. Wilson and R. Herrnstein, *Crime and Human Nature* (New York: The Free Press, 1985).

37   See Bentham 1948; Vold and Bernard 1986:20–30.

38   See Barbara Hudson, *Understanding Justice – An Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern Penal Theory* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996).

39   See J. Rawls, 1971.

40   See B. Headley, A Spade is Still a Spade: Essays on Crime and the Politics of Jamaica (2002) which documents and analyses this discussion.

41   Cited in H. Neita, *Hugh Shearer: A Voice for the People* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005) pp. 251.

42   See *Daily Gleaner*, May 28, 1978.

43   See B. Headley, "Man on a Mission: Deconstructing Jamaica's Crime Management Head," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 5:1, 2002, pp. 179–191.

44   See Frazer (1979) for a discussion of police powers under the colonial regime.

45   See Allen (1980) for a discussion of these laws.

46   This rate is higher than the rate computed from data provided by the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica*, 2007.

47   See the *Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica*, 1978 and 1994.

48   The 2007 figures were computed using the end of year prison population. A more representative figure would have been the mean population for the year. This was, however, not available.

49   See A. Francis and K. Campbell, A Supply Function of Crime in Jamaica. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology*, Vol. 7, 1–2, 2002.

50   Allan Douglas, a former colonel in the Jamaica Defence Force, has since written a public apology for the incident, which was published in the *Daily Gleaner*. He was not directly responsible but was an officer at the time of the incident.

51   For a discussion of these incidents see "The Braeton Seven – Report on the Observation of Seven Autopsies in Jamaica, 29 March 2001". Amnesty International AMR38.09.2001, and "Killing Impunity: Fatal Police Shootings and Extrajudicial Executions in Jamaica: 2005–2007". A report by the International Human Rights Clinic, The George Washington University Law School and Jamaicans for Justice, 2008. In both instances, police officers from this unit were tried in the courts and acquitted of all charges that were brought against them.

52   See the National Institute of Justice http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm, and the *Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2007).

53   See Stenson 1995, pp. 2.

54   Cited in Stenson 1995.

55   See http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=td&v=74. This is consistent with the figures given by the Central Statistical Office of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for 2006.

56   See Duff and Garland 1994, pp. 9.

57   See Currie 2000:421.

58   Bloomstein 1993:7, cited in Barlow 1995:4.

59   Ibid.

60   See Peteet 2002.

61   See Jeremy Bentham, "The Opinions of Different Authors on the Punishment of Death" cited in Paul Winters, *The Death Penalty – Opposing Viewpoints* (1809; San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1997) p. 25.

62   A possible exception may have been the judiciary. Earlier surveys that were conducted in the early 1990s suggested that it was regarded as competent and largely free of corruption but biased against the poor.

63   See Powell 2007:27.

64 J. Dalby, *Crime and Punishment in Jamaica 1756–1856* (Kingston: Social History Project, Department of History, UWI Mona, 2000).

65 I am not suggesting that this is a universal truth. The effects of such punishments depend in part on whether they are seen as just and the state authorities that administer them are authoritative and legitimate.

66 In 2004, the mean police rate for the European countries was 352/100,000 while the rate for the USA was 326/100,000. See Gruszczynska and Marshall 2008:12–13.

67 Figures on the strength of the TTPS were secured via personal correspondence with senior police officers. The homicide figures are from the TTPS and have been made public.

68 See A. Francis, and K. Campbell, 2002.

69 See J. McLean, A. Harriott, E. Ward, J. Buchanan, and R. Karia, "Jamaica – Community-Based Policing Assessment" (Kingston: Jamaica Constabulary Force and United States Agency for International Development, 2008).

70 See G. Kelling, et al. (1974). These experiments did not consider the effects of increased police strength if the style of policing was also changed. The report generated lively debates with critiques and critiques of the critiques.

71 See the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* for the respective years.

72 Interview with Brig. Josephs, the officer in charge of the SAUTT, June 2008.

73 See R. Brathwaite, "Community Safety Assessment, Report for the Citizen Security Programme," (2007) p. 7 (mimeo).

74 There are several reasons for this in the Trinidadian and Jamaican contexts which are best discussed elsewhere.

75 In 1692 the English passed the Highwaymen Act which offered the reward of most of the property of any thief that was captured and convicted and also gave a royal pardon for the crimes of the thief-taker. For a further discussion of this issue see Carl Klockars, *The Idea of Police* (London: Sage Publications, 1985).

76 An example of this is labelling theory, which is credited to Tannenbaum (1938).

77 See *Daily Gleaner*, September 15, 2000.

78 See Michael Manley, *The Politics of Change – A Jamaican Testament* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974) for an exposition of his view on the developmental issues at the time.

79 It may be argued that the economic crisis developed earlier and that it simply deepened during the mid-1970s.

80 See J. Incardi, *Criminal Justice* (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publications, 1993).

81 Stone 1988:23.

82 I write this reluctantly as I do not enjoy the popular blood sport of politician bashing. Some politicians recognize the problems of the political system and are working to bring about positive change. Despite their efforts the institutional practices have continued.

83 See Harriott 2008b for a discussion of the distinctions between when peace-making may and may not be appropriate.

84 A failed attempt on this scale would not simply result in a return to the status quo ante but rather a worse situation. Power rebuffed is always relatively weaker. The criminal groups would strengthen their hold in the communities.

85 I have had the benefit of some rather interesting discussions with a few experts in financial investigations in other countries.

86 See for example, *A New Era in Policing in Jamaica: Transforming the JCF – The Report of the JCF Strategic Review Panel* (2007), *Corporate Strategy of the JCF* (2005), *Jamaica Justice System Reform Task Force – Final Report* (2007) and several other reports and plans such as Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (2001).

87 See Francis et al. 2009 (forthcoming).

88 See UNODC/World Bank 2007, pp. 26–38.

89 For a report on this programme, see "Best Practice Review of 20 Caribbean Crime Prevention Initiatives," Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, UWI (unpublished paper).

90 I thank Horace Levy for providing me with these facts.

91 Dillon Alleyne of the Department of Economics, UWI Mona campus, has consistently argued this point.

92 As a special case, the garrison requires special attention and will have to be discussed elsewhere.

93 See the website of the Bank of Jamaica at www.mof.gov.jm

94 The UNODC/World Bank (2007) study makes the case that violent crime is a serious drag on economic growth.

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